

ADHIKARAṆA (5) : *Dēvatādhikaraṇa* : *Details are not prompted by the Deity.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—“THE DEITY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PROMPTING (THE DETAILS OF SACRIFICE). BECAUSE THE FEEDING IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE DEITY.—AS IN THE CASE OF THE GUEST.”

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* starts off with objecting to the *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, so far as the Deities are concerned]—“It is not true that *Agni* and other deities are not prompters of details : as a matter of fact, all the deities should be taken as prompting all the details.—How ?—*Because the feeding is for the sake of the Deity* ; what is called a ‘Sacrifice’ is only the *feeding of the Deity* ; what is done at it is that an eatable substance is offered to the Deity ; apparently the *sacrifice* is found to be declared as an act of *giving* (offering), of which the Deity is the recipient ; and such a *recipient* is more desired even than the *objective* which has been defined as ‘the most desired’ ; hence the Deity cannot be regarded as a subordinate factor (as asserted in Sū. 5) ; on the contrary, the *substance* and the *act* (of offering) are subordinate to the Deity.—Then again, the *sacrifice* is a form of worship of the Deity ; and in ordinary life, we find that the act of worship is always subordinate to the object worshipped.—The case in question should be treated like that of *guests* ; that is to say, whatever service is rendered to the Guest is regarded as prompted by the Guest ; similarly in the case in question, whatever is done in course of a sacrificial offering to the Deities should be taken as prompted by those deities].”

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*’s Opponent—“By arguing as you do, you admit that the Deity has a material body and also actually eats (the offerings)”.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—“Certainly, the Deity has a material body and also eats (what is offered).—How so ?—(a) Because of the *Smṛti-texts*,—(b) because of Custom, and—(c) because of the Indicative Texts.—(a) The *Smṛti-texts* clearly declare that the Deity has a material body, and we regard *Smṛti-texts* to be authoritative ;—(b) then again, it is customary with people to treat the deity as with a material body ; for instance, they paint, and speak of, *Yama* with a mace in his hand, of *Varuṇa*, with a noose in his hand, and of *Indra*, with a thunderbolt in his hand ;—from this customary treatment of the Deities also we infer the validity of the *Smṛti-texts* (describing the material bodies of deities) ;—(c) lastly, we have the following indicative text—‘*Jagbhmā tē dakṣiṇam indra*

hasam ' [' O Indra, I take hold of your right hand ']; as a matter of fact, it is only one having a body who has a *right* and a *left* hand;—then again, there is the following text—*Imā chot indra rodasī apātī pat saq-
blamā maghavan kāshirittē* ' [' O Indra, Maghavan, this illimitable Earth and Heaven you hold in your fist ']; the term '*Kāshī*' means *fist*; and this also is possible only for one who has a human body;—then again, there is the text—*Tvayāpīro vaṅḍarāḥ sabūhuranadhūso malē indro cttvāni
jyghoutē* '; this speaks of '*grīvā*', '*neck*'; '*udara*', '*stomach*'; and '*bāhu*', '*arms*'.—all of which is indicative of a human body.—From all this it follows that the Deity has a material body.

“The Deity also eats (what is offered).—How do you know that ?”—
(a) Because of *Smṛti-texts*, (b) because of Custom, and (c) because of Indicative Texts.—(a) There are *Smṛti-texts* speaking of Deities as actually eating what is offered;—(b) people treat of Deities as if they actually ate what is offered,—as is clear from the fact that they offer to them various kinds of food;—(c) lastly, the following texts indicate the Deity as actually eating—(1) '*Addhī indra pība cha prasthitasya*' [' O Indra, please eat and drink of what has been offered '];—(2) '*Viśhrāsanāni jatharēsu dhattē*' [' He puts into his stomach all kinds of food '];—and (3) '*Ekvaṅ prati
ghā pibatsākam sarāmsi trīṣhatam*'.”

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent—“The Deity cannot be regarded as eating what is offered. If it did eat it, then the quantity of the offering would diminish.”

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—“What the Deity partakes of is only the *essence* of the food; like the Bee.—How do you know this ?”—As a matter of fact, what has been offered to the Deity becomes insipid; and from this it follows that the Deity partakes of the *essence* of the food.”

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—continued]—“ALSO BECAUSE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF WEALTH.”

Bhāṣya.

[The *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent may argue as follows]—(a) ‘If the Deity were the owner of any wealth, and (b) if it were pleased on being worshipped, —then alone there would be some justification for the worship of the Deity to be performed for the purpose of pleasing that Deity. As a matter of fact, however, neither of these two facts is true [i.e. (a) the Deity is *not* the owner of any wealth, and (b) the Deity is *not* pleased at being worshipped].’

This is the Argument that is answered by the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the present *Sūtra*—“As a matter of fact, the Deity is actually the owner of wealth.—‘How do you know that ?’—(a) From the *Smṛti-text*, (b) from Custom, and (c) from Indicative Texts.—(a) The *Smṛti-texts* declare that the Deity

owns wealth :—(b) The Custom of having such names as ‘*Dēvagrāma*’ (‘the Deity’s village’), ‘*Dēvakṣētra*’ (‘The Deity’s field’), lends support to the said declaration of *Smṛti-texts* :—(c) lastly, there are Indicative Texts also showing Deities as owners of wealth : (1) ‘*Indro diva indra īshē pṛthi-gām, undrah apāmīndra it paretānām, indro vṛdhām, indra inmēdhirāṇām, andrah kṣēmā goṣē, havyē indrah*’ [‘*Indra* is the master of Heaven, of the Earth, of the Waters, and of the Hills; the master of trees, of *medhīras* (animate things?), master of welfare, of activity, of offerings’] :—again, (2) ‘*Īshānamasya jagataḥ svēshanīshānamindra tasthuṣē*’ [‘*Indra* the master of the moveable and the immoveable’].

“ Similarly (a) from *Smṛti-texts*, and (b) from *Custom*, we also learn that Deities are actually pleased. (a) *Smṛti-texts* distinctly declare that ‘Deities are pleased :’—(b) it is customary to speak of ‘*Pashupati* being so pleased with such and such a man, that a son has been born to him’, of ‘*Varuṇa* being so pleased with him, that wealth has been obtained by him’.—(c) Similarly we have Indicative Texts also to the same effect—‘*Āhutiḥhīrica hutālo devān pṛiṇāt*.’ ‘*Tasmāi pṛitā iṣamūrjam niyachchhant*.’ [‘One who makes the offerings pleases the deities with those offerings’; ‘Being pleased with him, the Deities reward him with wealth and strength’].”

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—concluded]—“ IT IS FROM THAT TOO THAT IT ACCRUES.”

Bhāṣya.

“ *It is from that*—i.e. the Deity—that *it*—the fruit—*accrues*—to the worshipper; when a man worships the Deity with sacrifice, then that Deity brings him into contact with the Fruit (the reward).—‘How do you know this?’—From the *Smṛti-text* and from *Custom*. There are *Smṛti-texts* declaring that ‘the Deity rewards the Sacrificer with the Fruit’.—This *Smṛti* declaration is confirmed by such customary declarations as—‘*Pashupati* was worshipped by him, and therefrom he got a son’.—There are Indicative Texts also to the same effect—(1) ‘*Sa it janēna sa vishā sa janmanā sa putraiṛvājambharatē dhanā nr̥bhīḥ devānām yaḥ pita ramā vi vāsati shraddhāsanā haviṣā brahmaṇaspatim*’ (?);—(2) ‘*Tr̥pta ēvainam-indrah prajayā pashubhistarpayati*’ [‘Being satisfied, *Indra* satisfies him with cattle and offspring’].—From all this it is clear that the Deity becomes pleased with the gift of offerings and with the singing of the praise of its good qualities,—and becoming pleased, it rewards the man with the desired fruit;—which proves that the deity *Agni* is the dispenser of the fruit of that action by which it has been pleased, and with which it rewards the performer of that act;—that any other deity, *Sūrya* for instance, is not able to give that fruit;—all this,—as to who gives what,—is learnt from the Vedic text; and the Vedic text, in this particular case, speaks of *Agni*, not of *Sūrya*.”

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SACRIFICE THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR BECAUSE THE MATTER IS ONE THAT CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY BY THE VEDIC WORD : AND THE DEITY IS SPOKEN OF ONLY AS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase 'api vā', 'in reality', signifies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

What has been asserted above,—to the effect that the Deity is the prompter of details,—is not true ; because, as a matter of fact, *it is the objective of the sacrifice*.—that is, the *Apūrvā*, Transcendental Result, produced by the sacrifice,—*that should be regarded as the principal factor*.—“Why so ?”—*Because the matter is one that can be determined only by the Vedic word* : in reality, what gives the Fruit is the prompter of the act ; and what it is that gives the fruit can be learnt only from the Vedic text, not by means of Sense-perception or any other means of cognition ;—the Vedic word clearly states that the Fruit proceeds from that which is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice',—not from the Deity—“How do you know that ?”—We learn it from the fact that it is the *Darśha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices that are spoken as the Instrument, in the text, '*Darśhapūrṇamāsābhyām sargakāmo gajēta*' ; so also in the text '*Jyotiṣtomēna sargakāmo gajēta*' ; in all such texts we find the 'sacrifice', not the 'deity', spoken of in connection with the 'desire for Heaven'.

Says the Opponent—“What the root 'to sacrifice' denotes is an act dealing with a substance and a deity [i.e. 'Sacrifice' is the act consisting of the offering of a substance to a Deity]”.

True, that is so ; but *the Deity is spoken of only as a subordinate factor* ; the *Substance* and the *Deity* are both accomplished entities ; while what is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice' is something that *has to be accomplished* ; and whenever an *accomplished entity* and a *thing to be accomplished* are spoken of together, the former is mentioned only for the purposes of the latter.—From this it follows that the Deity cannot be regarded as the prompter of details.

It has been argued that—“the Deity is more 'desired' even than the Objective, which is the *most desired*”.—We do not deny the fact that the Deity is 'desired' (intended to be expressed) ; in fact, whenever a term denotative of a deity appears either with the (deific) nominal affix or with the Dative affix, it is at once recognised, on the basis of Syntactical Connection, that the Deity spoken of is 'desired' ; but on the basis of Syntactical Connection, it is also recognised that the Fruit is connected with what is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice' ; and from the Direct Assertion of the Vedic text, it is this latter—the *Sacrifice*, not the *Deity*,—that is recognised as Instrumental (in the bringing about of that Fruit). Even though it is true that the *Sacrifice* is for the sake of the *Deity*,—that

does not set aside the fact of the *Sacrifice* serving the purpose of bringing about the Fruit :—it is the Fruit that is the purpose of (desired by) the Man ; all our activity is with a view to our own purpose,—and not to that of the Deity :—from this it follows that we would not have recourse to any activity on the prompting of the Deity ; as for the Recipient (i.e. the Deity) or the offering of sacrifice being ‘desired’,—that also is possible in reference to the fruitful sacrifice, and only when this *Sacrifice* is instrumental (in the bringing about of that Fruit).

It has been argued that—“*Sacrifice* is the *worship* of the Deity, and in ordinary practice one who is worshipped is the principal factor.”—But the matter in question need not be as it occurs in ordinary practice ; in the case in question it is the *worshipping* of the *worshipped* that forms the principal factor.

As a matter of fact, therefore, *that* should be regarded as the prompter of Details which brings about the result ; and hence *the objective of the Sacrifice* (i.e. the Transcendental Result) is what should be regarded as the prompter of the Details.

Further, in accordance with the *Pūrrapakṣa* view, it becomes necessary to admit that the Deity has a material body and eats what is offered,—because no ‘offering’ or ‘eating’ can be possible for one who has no body or does not actually eat.—In support of this view,—that the Deity has a material body and eats what is offered,—it has been argued that there are (a) *Smṛti-texts*, (b) *Custom*, and (c) *Indicative texts*.—This however is not right ; because the *Smṛti* is based upon *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts (of the *Ṛgveda*) ; it is a well-known fact that the knowledge that is derived from *Smṛtis* is on the basis of *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts ; and we are going to show later on that the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts do not lend support to any such notion (as that ‘Deities have material bodies and eat the offerings’).

Says the Opponent—“If the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts do not lend support to any such notion, then the *Smṛti*-texts in question cannot be based upon those *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts”.

Answer—The *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts afford a basis for the said declaration in *Smṛtis* only for those who look at the mere surface of those texts ; those however who look into the texts carefully find out that the notion is actually set aside by the texts. And yet the notion (obtained from a superficial study of the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts, even though set aside by their careful study) comes to be regarded by some people as the basis for the *Smṛti-declaration*.

It is on this same *Smṛti* again that the *Custom* (adduced by the *Pūrrapakṣin*) is based.

As regards the *Indicative Text* (adduced by the *Pūrrapakṣin*)—*Jaybhīmā tē dakṣiṇam indra hastam*—(speaking of the ‘right hand’ of *Indra*),—it does not mean what it has been taken to mean—that ‘*Indra* has got a right hand’ ; what it means is that ‘we have taken hold of what is *Indra*’s right hand’ ; hence this sentence does not afford the notion that *Indra* has hands.—“If that is not so, then no such assertion is possible that ‘we have taken hold of the hand’ ; because this assertion clearly implies the existence of

the hand,—‘the hand exists, which we have taken hold of.’—This is not possible; even though *Indra* may have a hand, yet the assertion that ‘we have taken hold of the hand’ does not pertain to a perceptible fact; to this extent, the assertion is certainly an impossible one; under the circumstances, the assertion can only be taken either as an absurd statement or as a merely eulogistic declaration;—And this explanation is equally possible in our view also.—It might be argued that ‘the assertion has been made by a person who actually took hold of *Indra*’s hand’.—Our answer to that is that no such idea can be entertained; as that would imply that the Veda (as represented by the text in question) has had a beginning in time.—Nor can the text be taken as asserting that ‘Some one took hold of *Indra*’s hands’; as there can be no authority for such an assertion. —‘From this text itself we deduce by implication that there *was* a person who took hold of the hand.’—That cannot be right; because it is possible for untrue assertions also to be made; as in the case of such ordinary assertions as ‘Ten pomegranates’, ‘Six cakes’, and so forth.

For one who holds the view that ‘*Indra* has a material body’, the addressing of that deity by the term ‘*Indra*’ can only be for the purpose of invoking him,—and the invoking can be only for speaking to him; now any such speaking would be reasonable only when it had been ascertained that the Deity addressed is related to the speaker;—as a matter of fact, however, it is not recognised by any means that the Deity addressed is so related; and so long as this has not been recognised, the invoking must be useless.—‘We recognise, on the basis of the text itself, that the Deity is invoked.’—It has been already explained that there can be no justification for the assuming of Hands and other limbs, if there is to be an assumption of unseen (transcendental) factors.—In fact, it cannot be definitely ascertained (from the words of the text) that the particular Deity is being invoked; for the simple reason that there is no means available for ascertaining this. From this it follows that the words of invocation are not for the purpose of being *addressed*, but only for the purpose of indicating (the Deity);—and under the other view also—that ‘the Deity has no material body’—the words would be regarded as serving the same purpose of indicating (the Deity).—Under the circumstances, the Vocative Ending would be taken as serving the purpose of eulogising; the sense of the eulogy being—‘The Deity is such an efficient instrument of accomplishing the desired result that it accomplishes it, on being invoked, in the same manner as beings endowed with intelligence (body and other things)’. Thus it is by being treated as an intelligent being that the Deity (*Indra*) is invoked by means of a word with the Vocative Ending; and having been indicated by means of the invoking word, the Deity is told ‘we have taken hold of your hand’,—which only means ‘we are dependent upon you’; and this only serves the purpose of reminding us that ‘we should proceed to perform the rites in honour of this particular Deity, *Indra*’.

[As for the text that has been quoted by the *Pārapakṣin* on p. 138 of the Text—‘*Imē chūt indra rodasā*, etc.’],—what this means is ‘O *Mughavan*, so praiseworthy is your fist that you hold within it the remote and

illimitable Heaven and Earth';—and here what is eulogistically spoken of as the 'fist' does not really exist; there is no proof for its existence. Then again, what the words of the Text also mean is, not that 'such a large fist is actually there', but that 'if you had a fist it would be large'; that is, 'You have a fist of a totally different kind and for a different purpose,—and even so that other fist of yours is large'.—"But praise is possible only through the mention of qualities that really exist."—Not necessarily; because even one who is not possessed of human limbs (and faculties) is eulogised as possessed of human limbs (and faculties); for instance, in such texts as the following:—(a) '*Ētē vadanti shatavat sahasravat abhikrandanti haritēbhīrasabhiḥ viṣṭvigrāvāṇaḥ sukṛtaḥ sukṛtyayū hotushchit pūrve haviradya-māshata*' [where speech is attributed to stones];—(b) '*Sukham ratham yuyujē sindhuwashvīnam*' [where the river *Sindhu* is spoken of as having yoked the chariot].—From all this it follows that the Vedic texts (quoted) do not necessarily lead to the presumption that Deities are like human beings.

Similarly the other text quoted—'*Tuigrīva indrah*, etc.'—does not mean that '*Indra* has a neck'; what it means is that 'if *Indra* has a neck, it must be large'; for the actual existence of the *neck*, there is no proof at all. Nor can the praise of the *neck* lead to the Presumption of its existence; because, even without resembling human beings (in the possessing of a neck), it would be possible for the Deity to be eulogised as such.—Then again, in the same sentence there are the words—'*Indro vṛtrāṇi jighnatē*';—now when the term '*indrah*' (as occurring here) has become connected with the two words here ('*vṛtrāṇi*' and '*jighnatē*'). it cannot be construed with the other words '*tuigrīvaḥ*' and the rest: as that would render it necessary for the words '*indrah*' to be taken twice—(1) '*Indra* should be regarded as *tuigrīva*, with large neck', and again (2) '*Indra* kills the *Vṛtras*'; and such a construction would involve a syntactical split; and yet what we find in the Veda is a single complete sentence. This character of the sentence is preserved only if the character of 'having a large neck' and the rest is not taken as enjoined in reference to the Deity, and the said character is taken as mentioned only for the purposes of praise.

Similarly, the sentence—'*Andhaso madē īdṛsho vṛtrāṇi hanti*'—is only predicative of the *Killing of Vṛtra*.

The sentence '*Bāhū tē indra romashau, akṣī tē indra piṅgalē*' also speaks only of *Indra's* arms as 'covered with hair'; and of *Indra's* eyes being 'tawny',—it says nothing regarding the *arms* and the *eyes* being actually there in existence.

There is a text which speaks of the actual presence of the *Eyes* (of *Indra*)—'*Chakṣuṣmatē śṛṇvatē tē bravīmi*' ['I address you, who have eyes and who hear '];—but this also is not meant to connect the *Eyes* (with *Indra*), but to connect the *addressing* with him;—this is what is meant by the clause 'I address you who have Eyes'; and here also it is for the purpose of eulogising the Deity that the *eyes* are spoken of as if they were actually present.—"How do you know this?"—We deduce this from the presence of the Dative Ending; if we took the sentence as laying stress

upon what is expressed by the basic noun (and not by the Dative Ending), then there would be a syntactical split,—as there would be two predications—(1) ‘You have eyes’, and (2) ‘I address you who have eyes’.

From all this it is clear that there is no *indicative text* which points to the fact of Deities being like human beings.

Nor is there any ‘feeding’ or ‘eating’ in the case of sacrifices; in fact, the Deity never eats; hence the argument adduced (under Sū. 6) that “Feeding is for the sake of the Deity” is not true.

The ‘*Smṛti*’, ‘*Custom*’, and ‘*Indicative texts*’ that have been put forward in support of the view that Deities actually eat the offerings,—are all refuted by the fact of the Deities having no material body.

Further, if the offering were made to the Deity actually eating it, then the substance offered would diminish in quantity.—Nor is there any proof for the statement that “Deities partake only of the essence of the food, like bees”; in the case of *bees*, we actually see that they take up the mere essence (of flowers); we do not see any such thing in the case of Deities. Hence we conclude that Deities do not eat the offerings.

As for the statement that “what has been offered to Deities becomes insipid” (which has been cited as proof of the fact that the essence of the offering is eaten by them).—this does not affect our position; as it is by reason of being exposed to the air, and of becoming cold, that the substance becomes insipid.

Further, the Deity does not own any thing; and not *owning* anything, how could it *give* anything?—It has been argued that—“there are (a) *Smṛti-texts*, (b) *Custom*, and (c) *Indicative texts*, which show that Deities do actually possess things”.—But that is not so; because (a) as for the *Smṛti-text*, it has its source in *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts, as already explained above.—(b) As regards the *Custom* of having such names as ‘the village of the Deities’, ‘the field of the Deities’,—all this is purely figurative; as a matter of fact, anything can be said to be possessed by one only when he has the power to make such use of the thing as he likes; and Deities certainly have not the power to make such use of the village or the field as they like.—From this it also follows that the Deity cannot *give* anything; all that happens is that when the worshippers of the Deity have made an offering to it, out of this act of offering there comes prosperity to those worshippers.

It has been argued that—“there are texts indicative of the fact that Deities *own* things,—‘*Indro diva indra īshē*’ (which speaks of the Heaven as being possessed by *Indra*), and so forth”.—But when we actually see that Deities do not possess anything, we conclude that all such statements are purely figurative.—Says the Opponent—“It is on the authority of Vedic declarations that we hold that Deities possess things; and from the well-known fact of Temple-priests making use of various things we conclude that such use is according to the wish of the Deities”.—This is not right; what is vouched for by direct Perception is that the things are used according to the wish of the Temple-priests themselves (and not of the Deities);—this fact cannot be got rid of.—In fact, even those who speak of the Deities

as possessing the things, do not deny the will of the Priests (as determining the actual using of the things); in fact, they themselves say that 'the Deity does as the attendant priests wish'; and that person who follows the will of another and who cannot make use of the things according to his own wish cannot be the *owner* of those things.—Lastly, the text in question cannot be taken as a Direct Assertion (of a fact); in fact, on account of its speaking of the Present time, and by reason of its stating what is contrary to perceived facts, it has to be taken as a purely eulogistic declaration; and so long as the text can be taken as purely eulogistic, it cannot justify the statement that "on the strength of Direct Assertion, Deities should be regarded as possessing things".

Lastly, it is not a fact that the Deity unites people with the fruit of their acts,—for the sake of which they would worship it.—As regards (a) the *Smṛti*, (b) *Custom*, and (c) *Indicative texts* that have been put forward in support of the view that Deities are pleased and reward (the performer).—we have already answered the '*Smṛti-text*' and the '*Custom*'. As regards the *Indicative text*—'Pleased with him, the Deities reward him with wealth and strength',—this also does not lend support to the Opponent's view; as this text occurs in connection with an entirely different injunction, which lays down that 'one should avoid passing by the right'.—Similarly, the text—'Being satisfied, *Indra* endows him with cattle and offspring',—all that this lays down is the offering to '*ndra*'.

From all this we conclude that the Deity is not the prompter of any sacrificial detail.

SŪTRA (10).

IN THE CASE OF THE GUEST, HE IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, AS HIS SATISFACTION IS THE MAIN CONSIDERATION; IT IS NOT SO IN THE CASE OF THE SACRIFICIAL ACT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 6) that the case in question is like that of 'guests'. This remains to be refuted.

What is done for the Guest must be regarded as *prompted* by the Guest; because in the honouring of guests, what is enjoined is that the guests should be pleased; the injunction being that 'the Guest is to be treated in such a manner as to please him,—Gifts may be made to him, or he should be fed,—whatever else he wants should be done,—he should not be forced to do what he does not wish to do'.—In the case of the *Sacrificial Act*, however, there is no such injunction of *pleasing* (the Deity).—Hence there is no analogy between the case of *Guests* and that of the *Sacrificial Act*.