

ADHIKARĀṆA (4): *Dharma not amenable to such means of Cognition as Sense-perception and the like.*

SŪTRA (4).

THAT COGNITION BY A PERSON WHICH APPEARS WHEN THERE IS CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGANS IS 'SENSE-PERCEPTION', AND IT IS NOT A MEANS (OF KNOWING DHARMA), AS IT APPREHENDS ONLY THINGS EXISTING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The examination (promised in the preceding *Sūtra*) is as follows:—Sense-perception is not the means (of knowing *Dharma*),—why?—because the character of Sense-perception is that it is 'that cognition by a person, etc.' (*sūtra*); that is, it is that cognition which a man has when his sense-organs are in contact with the object cognised.—*Dharma* however is something that is yet to come, and it does not exist at the time that it is to be known;—while Sense-perception is the apprehending of an object that is actually present and not non-existent at the time (of cognition);—hence Sense-perception cannot be the means (of knowing *Dharma*).

In the *Sūtra*, no stress is meant to be laid upon either 'cognition', or the 'appearance', or upon mere 'contact'; the only factor meant to be emphasised is the fact of its being such as is possible only when there is contact between the sense-organ and the object, and not when there is no such contact between them. If stress were laid upon several factors, then there would be syntactical split.

As for (the other means of Cognition,) Inference, Analogy, and Apparent Inconsistency, these also presuppose (are based upon) Sense-perception; hence these also cannot be the means (of knowing *Dharma*).

Nor can *Dharma* be amenable to 'Negation' [i.e. it cannot be regarded as non-existent; because of the reason given in the next *Sūtra* which indicates the real means of knowing *Dharma*].

ADHIKARĀṆA (5): *Dharma cognisable by means of Verbal Injunctions.*

SŪTRA (5).

THE RELATION OF THE WORD WITH ITS DENOTATION IS INBORN.—INSTRUCTION IS THE MEANS OF KNOWING IT (DHARMA),—INFALLIBLE REGARDING ALL THAT IS IMPERCEPTIBLE; IT IS A VALID MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, AS IT IS INDEPENDENT,—ACCORDING TO BĀDARĀYAṆA.

Bhāṣya.

'*Autpattika*' ('inborn'),—what we mean by this is 'constant'. It is existence (presence) that is figuratively spoken of as 'origin'. What is meant is that the relation between word and its meaning is inseparable.

able.—It becomes the *means of knowing* [*jñāyatē anena iti jñānam*'] says the *Shlokavārtika* 5. 9] *Dharma* in the shape of *Agnihotra* and such acts, which are not known by means of Sense-perception and such other means of knowledge.—“How so?”—Because there is ‘*Instruction*’; ‘*instruction*’ stands for the speaking of a particular set of words. [Thus it is the *Word*, in the form of *Instruction* or *Injunction*, which is the means of knowing *Dharma*.]—Of this ‘means of knowledge’ there is ‘*infallibility*’; i.e. the cognition brought about by that means never fails (is never wrong); when a cognition is not found to be wrong, it cannot be said with regard to it that ‘this is not so’, or ‘the real thing is not as it is represented by this cognition’, or ‘the real thing is otherwise than what is represented in this cognition’, or ‘it may be that the idea in the mind of the speaker is different from what is expressed by his words’, or ‘the words used give rise to contradictory ideas, representing the same thing as *existing* and as *non-existing*’.—For these reasons (since cognition brought about by words is not fallible), it is ‘*a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent*’. That is, when a cognition has been brought about by means of words, there is no need for any other cognition (to corroborate it), or of any other person as having the same cognition.—The mention of ‘*Bādarāyaṇa*’ means that ‘what is stated here is the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa’; and the name is mentioned only for the purpose of showing reverence to Bādarāyaṇa, and it does not mean that what is stated is not the author’s (Jaimini’s) own opinion.

There has been some confusion regarding the exact extent of the ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’ introduced by Shabara on page 7, line 18. This confusion has been due to the Editor of the *Bhāṣya* (Bib. Ind. Ed.), who puts the words ‘*Vṛttikāramatam samāptam*’ (at the end of *Bhāṣya*, page 18, line 6); and to the Editor of the *Shlokavārtika* who has put the words ‘*Vṛttikāragranthah samāptaḥ*’ at the end of 26 Kārikās.

As a matter of fact, the ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’ starts with page 7, line 18, and ends with the end of the *Bhāṣya* on *Sūtra* 5, page 24, line 11.

That all this represents ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’ is borne out by Maṇḍana Mishra who says in his *Mīmāṃsānukramanīkā*—

बह्वर्थं बहुकामेन तमर्थं सूचयिष्यता ।

वृत्तिकारमतेनेयं त्रिरुचौ वर्णतेऽन्यथा ॥

The ‘*bahu-artha*’ spoken of here can only be all those philosophical topics that we find dealt with in the *Bhāṣya* (pages 7 to 24). If it had referred only to what is said regarding the *Pratyakṣapramāṇa*, Maṇḍana Mishra could have had no justification in speaking of it as ‘*bahu-artha*,’ ‘many topics.’—The so-called ‘*Vṛttikāramatam*’ in the *Shlokavārtika* also deals with a part of *Sūtra* 4 only; and if this was all that was meant by the *Vṛttikāra*, then the *Bhāṣya* would have introduced it after *Sūtra* 4 and not after *Sūtra* 5.

The interpretation of the *Vṛttikāragrantha*, according to this view, is as follows: *Sūtra* 3 puts forward the view that it is not necessary to carry on a detailed enquiry into the question of *Pramāṇa* for *Dharma*. [In this case a *na* has to be added to the *Sūtra* which necessity has led Prabhākara to the view that the *Bhāṣyakāra* is quoting the ‘*Vṛttikāramata*,’ not with approval, but only as a view held by ‘others,’ ‘*para-mata*’]; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the exact nature of all *Pramāṇas*, including *Shabda* or *Chodanā* is already well known. Against this the opponent urges (*Bhāṣya*, pages 7, l. 21) that examination is necessary

on account of the chances of error.—This objection is answered in the first half of Sūtra 4, where the right perceptual process is described (this is obtained by transposing चत् and तत्), and it is shown that Perception by itself is never erroneous, and must be accepted as valid until we discover some defect in the process leading up to it. Similarly with Inference and the other forms of Cognition.—This goes on up to Bhāṣya, page 10, line 10.—The upshot of all this is that all cognition is inherently valid.—Next the opponent raises the objection against the *prāmāṇya* of *Shabda* specially (page 10, l. 22). This objection—according to the *Vṛttikāra*—is embodied in the second part of Sūtra 5; and after a series of objections and counter-objections, the final conclusion on the point is stated on page 18, l. 6.—The discussion regarding *Ātman* also arising out of what occurs in the *Vṛttikāramata*, this latter *mata* must be taken as extending up to the end of Sūtra 5 (page 24, line 11).

According to the *Brhātī* and *Rjuvimalā*, the *Bhāṣya* does not approve of the explanation propounded by the *Vṛttikāra*; but according to Maṇḍana Mishra, the *Bhāṣya* has purposely introduced this explanation as it provides Shabara with the opportunity of dealing with many philosophical topics.

The author of the *Vṛtti* has explained the text beginning with Sūtra (3) [i.e. Sūtras 3, 4, and 5] in the following entirely different manner]:—

[The *Siddhānta* view propounded in the Sūtra (3) is that] *the means of (knowing Dharma) need not be examined* (Sūtra 3) [The negating ‘na’ has got to be added in this case]; because Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition are all well known; and as for the Scripture (*Shāstra*, *Veda*), this also is included among those same Means of Cognition; hence this latter also need not be examined.

The argument against this is that the examination is necessary, because of mistakes; for instance, the shell is sometimes actually perceived as silver, which shows that Sense-perception is sometimes wrong; and if Sense-perception may be wrong, it follows that Inference and the other Means of Cognition, being based upon Sense-perception, may also be wrong. Such being the case, if one were to act entirely in accordance with the notions derived through the said Means of Cognition,—without an examination (regarding the validity or otherwise of the means concerned),—he would fail in his purpose, and might, at times, come by what is undesirable.

Siddhāntin :—It is not so; as what is real *Sense-perception* is never *wrong*; what is *wrong* is not *Sense-perception*. What is real *Sense-perception* is explained in Sūtra (4), which (being construed by transposing ‘sat’ and ‘tat’) means that ‘That Cognition is real *Sense-perception* (*sat pratyakṣam*) which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs with the object perceived (*tatsamprayogē*)’; that is to say, when the sense-organs are in contact with the object actually perceived, the resultant cognition of the man is real *Sense-perception*,—and it is not real *Perception* when the object perceived is different from that with which the Sense-organ is in contact. [So that in a case where the *shell* has been perceived as *silver*, what is perceived is the *silver* while the eye is in contact with the *shell*, not with the *silver*; hence this is not a case of real *Sense-perception* at all].

Question :—“How is it to be understood that one perception appears on the actual contact (of the sense-organ) with the object perceived, and another does not appear on such contact?”

Answer :—When it is found that at the time of the perception in question, there is no contact (of the sense-organ concerned) with any object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the contact with the object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived.

Question :—“ But, how can this be ascertained,—when, as a matter of fact, at the time that a person perceives the *shell* to be *silver*, he thinks that his eyes are actually in contact with real *silver* ? ”

Answer :—In cases where a perception is subsequently followed by a sublative cognition to the contrary—such as ‘in reality it is not as I have perceived, my perception has been wrong’,—it is understood that the perception in question had appeared on the contact of the sense-organ with something other than the object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative cognition appears, it is understood that the perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

Question :—“ How can this distinction be made before the appearance of the sublative cognition? In fact, at the time that the perception actually appears, there is nothing to differentiate a *right* cognition from a *wrong* one (until the subsequent appearance or otherwise of the sublative cognition). ”

Answer :—A cognition is *wrong*, (a) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement [the reading ‘*chakṣurādibhiḥ*’ is apparently wrong; what is wanted is some word expressive of a mental derangement],—or (b) when the sense-organ concerned (i.e. the eye) is beset by darkness or other such disabilities,—or (c) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too subtle (for perception) and so forth. While in cases where none of the three (mind, sense-organ, and object) suffers from these defects, the cognition is *right*. What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense-organ, the mind, and the object; when there is no such contact, the cognition is *wrong*; hence what leads to a wrong cognition is a defect in (one or the other of) the three factors (mind, sense-organ, and object). [In place of ‘*ubhaya*’, which means *both*, we should have ‘*tritaya*’ or some such word expressing *three*];—when these are defective, the cognition becomes *wrong*.

Question :—“ How do you know this ? ”

Answer :—It follows from the fact that on the disappearance of the defects, there appears the cognition which is recognised by all persons as *right*.

Question :—“ How is one to know if any of the three is defective or free from defects ? ”

Answer :—Even on careful scrutiny, if we do not find any defect, we should conclude that there is no defect, simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect.

From all this it follows that only that cognition is *wrong* the means whereof are defective, or with regard to which there is a sublative cognition that ‘it is wrong’,—and no other cognition can be regarded as *wrong*. [And

as all cognitions are not *wrong*, as stated by the Opponent, there can be no need for any examination of the Means of Cognition in general.]

[The Opponent next attacks the validity of Sense-cognition in general on the basis of *Idealism*—“All cognition is baseless (without a real substratum in the external world), like dream-cognition. In the case of Dreams, we have found that *Cognition* has no real substratum;—waking cognition, also in the form ‘a pillar’ or ‘a wall’ and so forth, is a *Cognition*;—hence waking cognition also must be without a real substratum.” [This objection is introduced here with the view that if there is no *real* object in the external world, there can be no contact of the sense-organs with an object of perception; and hence no perception could fulfil the essential condition laid down in the definition of Sense-perception; which would mean that Cognitions are in their very nature wrong; and hence an examination of the Means of Cognition is necessary.]

The cognition of the ‘pillar’ that one has during the waking state is positively determinate; how then could it be *wrong*?

“In dream also the same cognition was equally positively determinate, before waking; there is no difference in the character (of the dream-cognition and the waking cognition of the *pillar*).”

It is not so; in the case of dream-cognition we find that it is sublated (set aside, rejected, on waking), which is not the case with the other cognition (i.e. waking cognition).

“But from the analogy of the dream-cognition, to which the waking cognition is similar, it may be presumed that *sublation* will follow in the case of the waking cognition also.”

This presumption in the case of the waking cognition would be possible only if the falsity of the dream-cognition were due to its being a *cognition*. That is to say, if the falsity of the Dream-cognition were due to the fact that it *cognises*, i.e. apprehends,—then, inasmuch as waking cognition also is a *cognition* in the same sense, it could not be said that this latter is otherwise (i.e. not false). As a matter of fact, however, the falsity of the Dream-cognition is inferred from other reasons, such for instance, as the fact of its being sublated by a cognition to the contrary—“How?”—When a man is sleepy, his mind is weak (inactive, not alert); and hence it is *sleepiness* which is the cause of falsity in the cognition appearing at the beginning and the end of sleep; and during deep sleep, there is no cognition at all; as it is only when a man is entirely unconscious that he is said to be ‘in deep sleep’.—From all this we conclude that the cognition of the waking man is not false.—“But during the waking state also, there may be some defect in the instruments of perception (which would give rise to false cognitions).”—If there were such a defect it would be detected.—“Even at the time of dreaming, the defect in the cognitive instrument is not detected.”—But in this latter case, on waking, the man realises that his mind had been beset with sleepiness [so that the defect is actually cognised in this case].

[The ‘baselessness’ or falsity of Cognitions as *cognitions* has been rejected on the general ground that no cognition can be regarded as baseless or false unless it is found to have been brought about by means of defective Instruments. This is

met by the Opponent with the assertion that cognitions have to be regarded as false or baseless, not only because they are brought about by means of defective instruments, but chiefly because they are devoid of a real external object,—hence there can be no real contact between the sense-organ and the object;—hence there can be no valid perception which has been defined as Cognition brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.]

[There has been some confusion of thought in regard to the exact position of the two sections which have been called by the editors from ancient times, '*Nirālam-banavāda*' and '*Shūnyavāda*'; which has led to the idea (a) that the portion of the *Bhāṣya* preceding the words '*shūnyastu*' deals with the doctrine of Idealism that there is no real object in the external world, hence all cognition is *baseless*,—and (b) that with the words '*Shūnyastu*' the *Bhāṣya* introduces the doctrine of Nihilism, that nothing, not even Idea, exists.—But this interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* is entirely wrong. From the last verse of the so-called '*Shūnyavāda*' section of the *Shlokavārtika* it is clear that the whole of that section is meant to establish the reality of the external object, in confutation of the doctrine of Idealism, and the only argument in refutation of the doctrine of Nihilism is that 'when the reality of the external object cannot be denied, it is all the more unreasonable to deny the reality of the Idea or Cognition'; so that the Mādhyamika doctrine of *Shūnyavāda* is not what is meant to be directly introduced or attacked in the *Bhāṣya* beginning with the words '*Shūnyastu*', which, in reality, is only a continuation of the refutation of the doctrine that there is no real external object. This is made clear by the section of the *Bhāṣya* concluding with the words '*Ato na nirālam-banah pratyayaḥ*', 'for this reason, cognition is not devoid of a real substratum'.—The *Brhātī* clearly says—"It should not be thought that the section of the *Bhāṣya* preceding the words '*Shūnyastu*' has refuted the denial of the real external substratum of Cognitions, and the section beginning with '*Shūnyastu*' proceeds to deal with the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism. Because the *shūnyatā*, '*voidness*', spoken of in the *Bhāṣya* is meant to be the *voidness* of the Cognition itself—i.e. the cognition is devoid of a real object,—and it is not that the Idea or Cognition itself is denied."—According to Kumārila (*Shlokavārtika*, *Shūnyavāda*, verse 3), the question discussed in the *Bhāṣya* beginning with '*Shūnyastu*' is—"Is it a fact that Cognition is able to function only when such objects as the Pillar and the like have an existence in the external world—or is it that Cognition rests in itself as the object cognised, and not in any object extraneous to itself?" So according to this also, the *Bhāṣya* does not introduce here a separate discussion of the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism.]

Opponent :—"But as a matter of fact, Cognition is an empty void—[i.e. devoid of substantial reality or foundation in the external world].—Why?—Because we do not perceive any difference between the form of the Object and (its) Cognition. What is perceived (by the senses) is the Cognition, hence we conclude that there is no form of any object apart from that Cognition itself."

Answer :—This would be so if the Cognition had the form of the Object; as a matter of fact, however, our Cognition is without form; it is the external object that has form, and is actually apprehended as existing in external space. Then again, the objective of the Sense-cognition is the object, not another Cognition; and this for the simple reason that Cognition, having only a momentary existence (specially according to the Opponent, Baudha), could never continue till the appearance of the other cognition (of which it could form the objective).

The Opponent might argue as follows :—

“[Is it not a fact, according to the *Siddhāntin* himself that] it is while itself coming into existence that the Cognition becomes cognised, and at the same time makes the other object (the external objective) cognised,—as is found to be the case with the Lamp (which is itself seen and renders other things visible)? [This argument is put in the mouth of the opponent, *not* as setting forth his own view, but only as against the contention of the *Siddhāntin* that Cognition cannot form the objective of a Cognition; the idea of the opponent being that even the *Siddhāntin* cannot deny the fact that a Cognition, while making its own objective cognised, must itself be cognised].”

We deny this; no one ever cognises a Cognition until the object has been cognised; it is only *after* the object has become cognised that the person comes to know of the Cognition, and this is through Inference [that is, according to us, the existence of the *Cognition* is only *inferred* from the fact of the *object being cognised*, which would not be possible if there were no *cognition*]; and thus there can be no simultaneity between the cognition of the *Object* and the cognition of the *Cognition* itself.

Opponent :—“ Even so (according to you), it is only after the Cognition has come into existence that you speak of the object as ‘cognised’, which cannot be done until the Cognition had come into existence; so that (even according to your own view that there can be no simultaneity) the fact would appear to be that it is the Cognition that comes into existence (and is cognised) first, and it is only after this that the object is known as ‘cognised’ [so that it cannot be true to assert that the Cognition becomes cognised by Inference *after* the object has been cognised].”

Answer :—It is true that the Cognition *appears* first; but it is not *cognised* first; it sometimes happens that even a cognised object is spoken of as ‘not cognised’ [when for instance, on referring to the past, a man says ‘I do not remember that I ever knew this thing’, even in cases where the thing might have actually been known to the man in the past,—says the *Shlokavārtika*].

Further, the form of the *cognition* is never apprehended except in terms of the *object* [which could not be the case if both Cognition and Object were cognised by Sense-perception; we never, for example, perceive Colour in terms of Touch, says the *Rjuvimalā*]. Hence the Cognition cannot be spoken of (as the object of perception); and what cannot be so spoken of cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. Thus it is that Cognition cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. [It can only be an objective of Inference].

Further, even if the Cognition and the Object were identical in form, it would be the *Cognition* that would have to be denied (a separate existence), and not the *Object* which is actually perceived. As a matter of fact, however, the two are *not* identical in form; when we infer a *Cognition* (from the fact of the object being cognised), we infer it *without* a form (simply as ‘cognition’, not as ‘cognition of such and such a thing’),—whereas when we directly perceive an *object*, we perceive it *with* a form.

From all this it follows that Cognition has its substratum in the object.

Further, whenever the cognition of ‘cloth’ appears, it does so invari-

ably only when the yarns (composing the cloth) are there [which establishes a permanent connection between the cognition and the object in the shape of the *cloth*, whose existence therefore cannot be denied]. If this were not so (if there were no such relationship between the *cognition of cloth* and the *cloth*), then even when the *yarns* would be there, it might be possible for a man with perfectly healthy organs to have the cognition of the 'Jar'. This however never happens. Hence we conclude that Cognition is not without a substratum (in the external world).

Thus the conclusion is that Sense-perception is never false or wrong. [And hence no examination of it is necessary].

When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs,—this second Cognition is what is called '*Anumāna*', 'Inference' (Inferential Cognition). [We take the compound '*Jñātasambandha*' in the sense of 'well-recognised relationship', according to the *Shlokavārtika*, 2; which appears to give the simplest meaning.]—This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds—(1) that based upon a directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship; as an example of the former, we have the (inferential) Cognition of 'Fire' following from the Cognition of 'Smoke' (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire which has been directly perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference we have the case where finding that the sun changes its position we infer that 'the sun is moving',—on the ground of our experience that in the case of the person Devadatta we have found that it is only after he moves that he changes his position (which experience has led us to the generalised premiss that 'whenever an object changes its position it moves', and it is on this generalised premiss that the inference of the movement of the sun is based).

'*Shāstra*' 'scripture', (Injunction), is that means of cognising the object not in contact with the senses, (i.e. *Dharma and Adharma*) which follows from verbal cognition. [The Bhāṣya does not waste time in providing a definition of 'Word' or 'Verbal Cognition' in general,—it defines only the particular form of 'Word', 'Injunction',—because it is only in reference to the means of Cognising *Dharma*, which has been declared to be Injunction alone, that the *Vṛttikāra* is proving the unnecessary character of an examination of the Means of Cognition; hence the term '*śabda*' stands for the Vedic or scriptural word, and '*artha*' for '*Dharma and Adharma*' which form the special subject-matter of Scripture.—*Shlokavārtika*, *Śabda*, 8–13.—According to the *Rjuvimalā*, '*Śabdaviññāna*' stands for the 'cognition of things through Word'—i.e. the cognition of something to be done; and the '*asannikṛṣṭa artha*' is *Injunction, urging to action*; hence '*Shāstra*' is that means of cognising Injunction which is derived from that knowledge of *something to be done* which is obtained through words.]—[And these two means of cognition also being well known do not need to be examined.]

'*Upamāna*', 'Analogy'—i.e. *similitude*—also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the *Gavaya* (which is similar to the cow) brings about the remembrance of the

cow (as being similar to the *Gavaya*). [According to *Rjuvimalā*, the meaning of the sentence is 'the sight of the *Gavaya* brings about the analogical cognition that "the animal seen is called *Gavaya*"', to the man who 'has remembered the cow'. This is the same as the *Nyāya* view, which has been controverted by the *Shlokavārtika*, whose rendering of the passage has been adopted in the translation.] [And as this Analogy is well-known, it does not need to be examined.]

'*Arthāpatti*', 'Presumption', also consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, and this *non-existence in the house* leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house [as without this, the aforesaid fact of his being alive and not in the house could not be explained.] [This also needs no examination.]

Abhāva, 'Negation', 'Non-apprehension', stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the (five) means of Cognition (described above); and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist', in regard to things not in contact with the senses. [That is, in a case where Sense-perception and the other means of Cognition are not found to be operative towards bringing about the notion of the *existence* of a certain thing, we have the notion of the *non-existence* of that thing; and the means by which this notion is brought about is called '*Abhāva*'—*Shlokavārtika*, *Abhāva* 1.] [This also being well-known, does not need to be examined.]

From all this it follows that (all) means of Cognition being well-known, they need not be examined.

The opponent raises a fresh objection :—"Sense-perception and the rest may be right means of Knowledge; but *Word* (Injunction) can never be so;—Why?—*The word (Vedic Injunction) is not a means of true knowledge, because what exists is actually perceived* (Sūtra 4, latter part). The Injunction (of the *Chitrā* sacrifice, for instance, for the purpose of acquiring cattle) is not a means of right knowledge; because if a thing which is perceptible is not perceived, it is taken as *non-existent*; as in the case of the Hare's Horn (which, not being perceived, is taken as non-existent); now (as regards the *Chitrā* sacrifice which is enjoined as bringing about the acquisition of Cattle) Cattle and such other things are such as could be perceived by means of the sense-organs; and yet we find that no cattle are found to appear after the performance of the sacrifice (*Chitrā*) enjoined for one desiring Cattle; and from this it follows that the sacrifice does not bring about Cattle [and hence that the Vedic Injunction is *false*, i.e. *not a means of right cognition*.] The effect of an act must appear at the time of the performance of the act itself; for instance, the pleasure derived from massage appears at the time of the massage itself.—It might be argued that the act may bring about its result at some future time.—But any result that may appear at some future time we cannot regard as being the result of that particular Act;—why?—because at the time when the Act itself was there, it did not bring about its result; while at the time when the result does appear, the Act itself is not there; and being itself non-existent, how could it be the bringer about of the

result?—Then again, of the particular effect (acquisition of cattle), we actually find other causes (in the shape of gift, purchase, and so forth); and so long as a perceptible cause is there, there can be no justification for assuming an imperceptible one. Thus having found the Veda to be fallible in this one case, we conclude that the other results also—such as Heaven and the like—do not really follow (from the Acts enjoined in the Veda).—Further, we find the Veda actually speaking of things contrary to what is actually seen; for instance, having enjoined the collecting of the Sacrificial vessels (on the death of the sacrificer), the Veda goes on to say that ‘the sacrificer thus equipped with the sacrificial implements goes straight to the heavenly regions’; this clearly refers to the *body*, and yet the body never goes to the heavenly regions, as it is actually burnt before our eyes. Nor can the word ‘*goes*’ be taken as an injunctive word (whereby the passage would mean that the body *should* go to heaven, and not that it actually *does go*; so that the sentence would not contain anything contrary to a perceptible fact).—Such apparently absurd assertions therefore cannot be the means of right Cognition; as they would be like such absurd assertions as ‘dry gourds sink in water, while stones float.’ Thus then we cannot have any confidence in the injunctions of the *Agnihotra* and such other Acts; as these Injunctions also belong to the same category as those that have been shown above to be absolutely false (and unreliable).—From all this it follows that *Dharma* is not ‘that which is indicated by the Veda as conducive to the highest good’—[as declared in ‘Sū. (2)']’.

The answer to the above is provided in the first part of Sūtra (5), ending with the word ‘*Jñānam*’—‘*But the relation of the word with its meaning is original, etc., etc.*’—The particle ‘*tu*’, ‘but’, serves to reject the opponent’s view. The meaning is that *the relation between the word and meaning—which relation does not originate from a human being [i.e. which is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other means of Cognition]—is the ‘Jñāna’, means of knowing,—‘Tasya’, ‘of that’, i.e. of such things as the Agnihotra and the like which are not cognisable by means of Sense-perception and the rest.* [If the connection of the word with its meaning were dependent upon other means of Cognition, then all those words and expressions which speak of things not amenable to the other means of Cognition, might be regarded as of doubtful validity; when however the said connection is self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is spoken of in the words of the Veda—*Brhatī* and *Rjuvīmālā*]. Thus then the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be right. In the case of a notion derived from words emanating from human beings, there might be doubts regarding its validity; because in that case what is asserted would be dependent (for its validity) upon things extraneous to itself [such as the validity of those sources from which the human being may have derived his knowledge of what he is speaking of, and so forth]. On the other hand, when a (self-sufficient) word (not emanating from a human source) speaks of something, why should that be false? Certainly we do not require any corroboration of what we learn from the said word. When the word ‘speaks’ of something, what is meant is that it makes that thing known, i.e. it becomes the means of that thing becoming known; so

that as soon as the means in the shape of the Word is there, what is spoken of by it becomes known by itself (without any extraneous help); under the circumstances, how could one call it 'false', declaring that 'what the word says is not really so'?—As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as 'this may or may not be so'; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person, does there appear any notion to the contrary, that 'it is false'.—As regards the idea that 'the notion derived from this Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false',—this is only an *Inference*, and as such becomes sublated by the aforesaid *direct* Cognition to the contrary.—From all this it follows that '*Dharma is what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good*'.

The Opponent raises a fresh objection:—'All this may be so; but in reality there is no relationship between the word and its meaning; how then could any such relationship be either created by human beings or not created by human beings?—Why?—If the relation between the word and the thing denoted by it were held to be of the nature of *Contact* (Conjunction), then on the utterance of the word "razor", the mouth (of the speaker) would be ripped open, and similarly on the utterance of the word "sweets", his mouth would become filled with sweets. As for the other kinds of relation—(a) that subsisting between the material cause and its product, or (b) that between the efficient cause and its effect, or (c) that between the container and the contained, or (d) that of birth and so forth,—these are not possible at all in the case of Word.'

The answer to the above is as follows:—The only relation that is possible to assert in the case, you do not assert; that is, the relation that subsists between the denoter and the denoted, which is the relation called 'that between the *name* and the *named*.'—'If the word is the *denoter* (of its meaning), then why does it not denote it when it is heard for the first time?'—The answer to this is that in every case experience is our guide (and authority); it is only when we find a word actually denoting a thing that we regard it as its 'denoter'; this is not possible in the case of a word heard for the first time, as in its case we have never found it denoting anything; in fact the meaning of a word is understood only when it has been heard (used) as many times as makes it definitely recognised that 'this word is the *name* and this thing is the *named*? [Nor does this need for repeated experience vitiate the denotativeness of the word; because] in the case of the Eye also it is found that it is unable to *see* if there is no external light, and yet this does not mean that the Eye has not the power to see. [Thus then, the conclusion is that there is a definite relation between the Word and what is denoted by it.]

[A fresh discussion is started:—Says the Opponent]:—'If (as has been just stated) the Word does not express anything when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the Word and the thing denoted by it must be one that is created (artificial)'—why?—(a) because *sui generis*, the word and the thing denoted are not related, as is clear from the fact that the word is uttered in the mouth while the thing denoted is found on the ground;

(b) because people clearly make such a distinction as “this is the *Word* not the *Thing*”, “this is the *Thing*, not the *Word*”;—and (c) because there is a clear difference in the forms of the two also: for instance, the word that they pronounce is in the form ‘*Gauḥ*’ (‘Cow’), while the object that they understand as denoted by it is *an animal with the dewlap and other features*; and in actual experience we have seen that any relation (or connection) that appears between two distinct things is artificial (created); as for example, the relation between the *jar* and the *rope* (to which it is tied).

[The answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* which is reiterated on page 15, lines 16 to 18, comes in the Text on page 15, line 18; in the interval in order to clear the ground, the Author discusses the three questions—(1) What is ‘word’? on page 13, line 7 to page 14, line 15,—(2) what is ‘meaning’ (or denoted thing)? on page 14, line 16 to page 15, line 14,—and (3) what is the ‘relation’ between the two? on page 15, line 15.]

(1) In the case of ‘*gauḥ*’ (‘Cow’), what is it that is called the ‘word’? The letters ‘*ga*’, ‘*au*’, and ‘*ḥ*’ (visarga) constitute the word—says the revered Upaśarṣa. Among people the term ‘word’ is applied to what is apprehended by the ear; and in the case of the word ‘*gauḥ*’, the said letters are what are apprehended by the ear.

The *Sphoṭavādin Grammarian* :—“If that is so, then no cognition of the meaning (of the word) is possible;—why?—because as a matter of fact the cognition of the meaning does not appear on the hearing of the single component letters severally; and apart from the components there is no single entity in the form of a *composite whole*, from which the cognition of the meaning would follow. At the moment of hearing the letter ‘*ga*’, the letters ‘*au*’ and ‘*ḥ*’ are not heard; and at the moment that these letters are heard, the letter ‘*ga*’ is not heard. From this it follows that the word ‘*gauḥ*’ (as a composite whole) is something different from the component letters ‘*ga*’ and the rest; and it is from this composite that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—It might be urged that after the word (i.e. the letters) have ceased, there is a remembrance (of them), and it is from this remembrance that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—But this also cannot be; as the Remembrance also has only a momentary existence and hence is as unable to bring about the Cognition of the meaning as the letters themselves.”

There is no force in all this, we reply; because what happens is that each letter, as it is uttered, leaves an ‘impression’ behind, and what brings about the cognition of the meaning of the word is *the last letter along with the impressions of each of the preceding letters*.—‘If that were so [i.e. if the cognition of the meaning were so derived from the *last letter*, etc.], then the assertion of the ordinary people that “we cognise the meaning from the *word*” would be unjustifiable.’—Our answer to this would be that if it cannot be justified, it must be unjustifiable; simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by any means of Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest. As a matter of fact, popular assertions are found to be of both kinds—some are justifiable (true) and some are unjustifiable (false); for instance, such assertions as ‘Devadatta, please

drive the cow' are justifiable (reasonable, serving a definite purpose); while such other assertions as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' and the like are unjustifiable (unreasonable, entirely purposeless, having no meaning).— "[It is not the popular notion alone that is contrary to the *Siddhānta* view.] Scientific writers also have made such declarations as 'what is denoted by a verb, like *goes* or *cooks*, is a single entity (act), consisting of several acts beginning with the starting (of the act) and ending with its fulfilment, ranging in sequence over several points of time' —(*Nirukta* 1-1) [which also lends support to the view that the word also is a composite whole apart from the component letters.]" —The answer to this is that even the declaration of scientific writers cannot render possible (or reasonable) what cannot be established by any valid means of Cognition.

Then again, there is nothing unreasonable in the view (stated by us) that the letters (composing a word) produce impressions, and from these impressions follow the apprehension of the meaning; so that in the bringing about of the apprehension of the meaning, the letters would be the cause.—"But in that case, the word would be only a subordinate cause (of the apprehension of the meaning)." —Not so; the causal efficiency of the letters is by no means subordinate,—because as a matter of fact, the apprehension of the meaning comes only when the letters are there, and it does not come when they are absent [which shows that the letters are the principal, not the subordinate, cause.]—But even if they were only a subordinate cause,—it would not be right to assume something not vouched for by Sense-perception or any other means of Cognition, simply for the purpose of saving the *Word* from being a subordinate cause. For instance, when it is asserted that 'the boy is fire', it is not understood that the Boy is actually *Fire*, for fear of making the word 'Fire' figurative (taken in the indirect or subordinate sense of 'brilliant');—for the purpose of saving the word 'fire' from being understood in its subordinate (or figurative) sense of (*brilliance*), the 'Boy' is not taken to be *Fire* itself (in the literal sense).

As a matter of fact also, such a word as 'go' (Cow) is never actually perceived apart from the letters 'ga' and the rest; and this for the simple reason that no difference is perceived between them (i.e. between the word and its component letters), and that they are actually found to be non-different. What again is actually perceived are only the letters 'ga' and the rest. From this it is clear that the word 'gauḥ', beginning with the letter 'ga' and ending with the 'ḥ', is only these letters themselves; and hence there is no such thing as 'Word' apart from those letters.

Objection :—'The assumption of Impressions (left by the component letters) involves the assumption of something that is not perceived'.

The answer to this is that the theory of the 'word' (as distinct from the letters) involves the assumption of the *Word* and also that of the *Impressions* (the assumption of which is necessary in this case also, for explaining the process of denotation); [whereas in our view, it is necessary to assume the Impressions only; so that while the Opponent's theory involves two assumptions, our theory involves only one assumption].—From all this we conclude that the letters themselves are the *word*.

(2) [The next question is]—What is the *denotation* (meaning) of the word ‘*gauḥ*’ (Cow)?—What we assert is that *the class (or genus) characterised by the dewlap and other features* is what is denoted by the Word.—[In the *Nyāya-sūtra*, ‘*Ākṛti*’ has been taken as different from *Jāti*, Class; it has been taken there in the sense of the *shape* or *form* that characterises a particular *Class* of things. In *Mīmāṃsā* however, we find that ‘*Ākṛti*’ is taken to be the same as ‘*Jāti*.’ The *Shlokavārtika-Ākṛti*, Verse 3 clearly says that ‘This *class (jāti)* itself has been called *Ākṛti* in the sense that the Individual is characterised (*ākriyatē*) by it’; and Maṇḍana Mishra also declares in his *Anukramaṇī* that ‘the word *go* denotes the Class.’]

The Opponent asks—“Is this ‘Class’ *something to be accomplished*, or not?” [The real motive behind this question is that, if the class is something to be accomplished, then its relation to the word cannot be *eternal*.]

[The answer is that] Being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished; as what is actually perceived is only an accomplished entity, such as the necklace, the road-crossing, the dish, and so forth.

‘But this (notion of *Class*) may be a mere illusion.’

That cannot be; unless we find a conception set aside or negated by a subsequent conception, we cannot regard it as an *illusion*.

‘As a matter of fact, we find such conceptions as *series*, *group*, *forest* (as single entities),—while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the component individuals [the *series* being nothing apart from the individual factors, the *group* being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, and the *Forest* being nothing apart from the trees. Similarly, the *Class* being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, the conception of the “Class” must be a misconception, a mere illusion].’

Not so; you have put forward a most incoherent statement. By asserting that ‘there is a conception of the Forest while in reality there is no such thing as forest’, do you mean to deny the validity of Perception (which provides us with a clear notion of the *Forest* as a real entity)? If so, then you might as well say that ‘the trees also do not exist’. In that case your view would be the same as that of the Bauddha Idealist (who denies the existence of all external objects); and this view we have already refuted. [So that what you have asserted does not lend support to your own theory that there is no such entity as *Class*].—Your assertion may be a complaint against the upholder of the *Class*, to the effect that “(by positing a single entity) you vitiate another doctrine of yours,—inasmuch as (according to you) the notion of the ‘Forest’ (as a single entity) appears while in fact there is no such (single) entity as Forest [what really exists is only a large number of trees; so that you have the notion of a *single* entity in reference to a *plurality* of trees; and this vitiates your doctrine” [Read for ‘*pi sati*’, ‘*pyasati*’, as read in *Brhātī*] that it is only a single thing that can be conceived of as a *single* entity.]—If such is your meaning, then, it comes to this that being unable to refute the theory under discussion, you proceed to find fault with a totally different doctrine, and thereby render yourself open to a ‘ground of defeat’ (in discussion, by shifting your ground); specially as what you put forward does not establish anything. Because

the Siddhāntin will retort—If the other doctrine becomes vitiated, let it be vitiated; what does it matter if that doctrine is vitiated or not vitiated? [The rule regarding the use of the singular or the plural number is not meant to be absolute; if then, it becomes vitiated by a perceptible fact, it does not matter; merely on the strength of the said rule, we cannot deny a perceptible fact.] What *does* matter is whether you succeed in establishing your own doctrine or in refuting my doctrine (regarding the subject-matter under discussion, i.e. the existence of the *Class*). Merely because the *Forest* is not perceived apart from the *trees*, it does not follow that the *Forest* does not exist; if there is some other reason which gives rise to a notion *against* (i.e. sublative of the notion of) the existence of the *Forest*, then only can the notion of the *Forest* be regarded as false; and then alone could we conclude that the *Forest* does not exist. [Even though in regard to the *Forest* and other things mentioned by you, such a sublative notion may appear, yet] in regard to such things as the *Cow* and the like (which we are discussing), we do not find our notion of *class* being sublated. So that there is no analogy between the two cases (that of the *Cow* and that of the *Forest*). In regard to the *Forest* and other things also, if there is no sublative notion, we cannot say that they do not exist.—From all this it follows that the statement that you have made regarding the *Series*, the *Forest* (and the *Group*) is entirely incoherent (having no bearing on the discussion, in hand).

The conclusion thus is that the assertion (of Jaimini) to the effect that ‘the *Class* forms the denotation of the word’ (*Sūtra* 1. 3. 33) is fully established. How the *Class* is denoted by the word we shall explain in detail later on (under 1. 3. 33).

(3) [The third question is]—“What is the *relation* (between the *word* and its *denotation*)?” [This question is introduced with a view to discuss the eternality of words and of their relationship to their denotations—says *Shlokavārtika* 10].

The answer is that the relation between the word and its denotation is that on the *word* being cognised, what is *denoted* by it becomes cognised. [That is, the relation of *Name and Named*, as already stated above.]

The opponent:—“We have already proved above that this relation is artificial; hence we opine that a certain person created the relation of words with their denotations and then with a view to make use of the words, he composed the *Vedas*.”

Our answer to this view is as follows:—What we have asserted (regarding the relation between word and its denotation) is established by the fact that the said relation could never have been created by a human being.

Question:—“But how do you know that the relation could not be created by a human being?”

Answer:—It follows from the fact that there could not have been any persons to create the relations.

Question:—“Why could there be no creator of the relation?”

Answer:—[No such creator can be admitted] because no such person can be cognised by means of Sense-perception, and the other means of cognition also are preceded by (based upon) Sense-perception.

“As the creator existed a long time back, it is only natural that he should be beyond the Sense-perception of men of the present day.”

Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of such (important) things as the Himālaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget the creator, in the manner in which the builder of a wall, a garden and such things becomes forgotten. In the case of these latter things there are such causes (for the builder being forgotten) as the disappearance (of all idea) of the builder, due either to the disruption of his country or to the extinction of his family. In the case of words and their meanings on the other hand there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them.

It might be argued that—“what men have to deal with is only the relation of words and meanings, and the matter of the creator of the relation would have no interest to them, and hence paying no heed to it, they would forget him.”

But this also is not possible. If there were a person who created the relation and started its use, he would surely be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage,—and not when there is disagreement between them. For instance, Pāṇini (Sūtra 1. 1. 1) is the creator or originator of the relation between the technical name ‘*Vṛddhi*’ and the letters ‘*āt-aich*’, and a person making use of words independently of Pāṇini, or one not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word ‘*Vṛddhi*’ as standing for those letters. Similarly Piṅgala being the originator of the connection between the technical name ‘*ma*’ and *three long syllables*, to a person not acting according to Piṅgala, or to one not accepting the work of Piṅgala as authoritative, the letter ‘*ma*’ could never bring about the idea of a group of three long syllables. Thus it is that there is always an agreement between the originator and the adopter (of a usage). Consequently persons who would be making use of the Veda would surely remember the creator (or originator) of the relation of words and their usage. If one forgot the author of Pāṇini’s *Sūtra* to the effect that ‘the term *Vṛddhi* stands for the letters *Āt* and *Aich*’ (1. 1. 1), he could never make any sense out of the *Sūtra* ‘*Vṛddhiryasyāchāmādistad vṛddham*’ [‘That group of letters is called ‘*Vṛddha*’ among the vowels wherein the first one is a *Vṛddhi*, i.e. *ā* or *ai* or *au*] (Pāṇini 1. 1. 73).

For these reasons we conclude that no person created the relations (of words) and then for the purpose of making use of them, composed the Vedas.

Even if the possibility of (the creator) being forgotten were there, we could not admit a creator of the relation unless there were proofs for it. For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, we do not merely on the ground of that possibility, admit the existence of the Hare’s Horn, because there is no proof of it. For this reason the relation between words and their meanings cannot be regarded as created by a person.

[The opponent puts forward a proof of the creator of word-relations]—
“We would deduce the existence of the creator of word-relations from

Presumption : As a matter of fact we do not find people comprehending the meaning of those words whose relation (to the meaning) has not been fixed. If people were to comprehend the meaning of such a word, they could comprehend the meaning of such words also as they might hear for the first time; as a matter of fact however they are not found to do so; hence there must be a person who fixes (creates) the relations (of words and meanings)."

This is not right. Because *words* are taught as accomplished entities (having the inherent power of denoting their meanings,—[This is what is meant by the term '*upadēśah*' in sūtra 5—says *Brhātī*].—If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator of word-relations, the meanings are never comprehended, then alone could we deduce a creator by presumption. In reality however, there is another way (in which the meanings of words are comprehended); for instance, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purpose, the younger men who happen to hear those words are actually found to understand them; these old people also, when they were young, understood the words as used by the older people at the time; these latter also understood them from other older people; and so on the process has gone on without any beginning in time. This is one possible explanation of the phenomenon (of the use and comprehension of words);—and the other explanation (proposed by the opponent) is that "in the beginning there was no relation at all between a word and its meaning, subsequently some one set going the relations."—Now as between these two possible explanations, so long as the explanation based upon the usage of older people is available [and it is actually perceived in everyday life], it would not be right to *presume* a creator of relations. Further the upholders of the 'Usage Theory' point to a fact of direct perception (in proof of their theory), while the other party only presume a creator of relations; and certainly Presumption has no force as against a fact of direct Perception. From all this it follows that there can be no creator of word-relations.

'*Avyatirēkashcha*', 'it is infallible', says the next term in sūtra 5. It is found that just as the word '*go*' denotes the *animal with the dewlap* in one place, so does it also in the most inaccessible places; how could it be possible for the many creators of the word-relation to come together? Certainly no single person could create a relation (that would receive such universal acceptance). For this reason also there can be no creator of word-relations.

Another writer explains the phrase '*avyatirēkashcha*' in the following different manner:—There can be no point of time when the word-relation has been totally absent and when no word has been related to any meaning.—Why so?—Because, if there were, then the act itself of creating the relation would not be possible; for when the creator of the relation would proceed to create a relation, he could do so only by means of words; and the question arises—who created the relations of the words that the said creator uses when creating the new relation? If those were created by some other creator, then who created the relations of the words used by the older creator? And so on and so forth, there would be no end to this

enquiry. Consequently, it has to be admitted that when a person would proceed to create new word-relations, he would make use of words whose relationships have come down through the usage of older people, and have not been created by any one. And when *usage* has to be admitted (at a certain point), why should it be at all necessary to presume any creator of word-relations at any point of time? Thus it is clear that there can be no valid Presumption either (in support of a creator of word-relations).

The opponent may ask—"How is it possible for the younger people, to whom the word-relations are not known, to learn the meanings of words from the older people?"

The answer to this is that the question of possibility cannot arise in regard to a directly perceived fact. Younger people are actually found to learn the meanings of words from older people; and on the other hand, they are not found to have any such comprehension of a creator of word-relations. Hence the cases (of words and creators) do not stand on the same footing.

The next phrase in *sūtra* (5) is—'*arthē anupalabdhē*' ('regarding what is imperceptible').—In regard to such imperceptible things as the *Deity* and the *like* [Right reading '*devatāḍau*' supplied by the *Bṛhatī*], the creating of a name (expressive word) would be useless and also impossible. When a thing is known in its general form, and its particular forms are not known, then alone are names propounded in regard to these particular forms; and in the case of such words as 'deity' and the like, no particular forms can be known; as both the conditions are absent. For this reason also the relation of the word with its meaning cannot be one created by any person.

For this same reason [of not having its relation created by a person], the Word is '*pramāṇam*' ('a valid means of knowledge' (*sūtra* 5),—'*anapekṣatvāt*' ('as it is independent') (*sūtra* 5); that is to say, being such as described, the word does not need (for its validity) another person or another cognition.

For all these reasons we conclude that Dharma is *what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction*:—and not what is indicated by anything else.

The significance of the mention (in *sūtra* 5) of the name '*Bādarāyaṇa*' has already been explained above.

[The Author now proceeds to answer the objections that have been urged by the Opponent against the trustworthy character of the Veda.]

It has been argued above that "Word (Injunction) cannot be the means (of knowing Dharma), as the result of the act is not found to appear at the time of its performance, and at the time that the result does appear the act is not there; consequently the word cannot be a means of right knowledge".—Our answer to this is as follows:—It would be true that Word is *not* a means of right knowledge, if there were only five such valid means (in the shape of Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy, Presumption, and Non-apprehension); every means by which a right cognition is obtained is a means of right cognition;—as a matter of fact, right cognition is obtained by means of *word* also;—therefore Word must be a means of right

knowledge,—in the same manner as Sense-perception is. If a certain thing is cognised by *one* means of cognition, it does not cease to be *cognised* if it is not cognised by another means of cognition [so that if the result of the act is cognised by means of the Vedic Word, it cannot be regarded as *not cognised* simply because that result is not cognised by other means of cognition]. Then again it is nowhere declared in the Veda that “the reward of the act is obtained merely by the performance of the act”; all that is said is that “the reward of the act is obtained”.—As for the argument that “at the time when the reward does appear, it is cognised by means of *Sense-perception* and not by means of the Word”,—this does not vitiate our position; because at that time Sense-perception is one means of cognising the reward, and Word also is the other means.

The opponent has cited a passage from the Veda which asserts something contrary to a fact of direct perception,—the passage which says that “the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeds straight to the heavenly regions”, where it is clearly the body that is spoken of (as proceeding to Heaven; while as a matter of fact the body is burnt).—Our answer to this is that in fact that entity also to whom the body belongs is spoken of as “equipped with the sacrificial implements”, by reason of the connection of those implements with the body (to which the said entity is related).—The opponent asks—“What is this other entity? We do not know of any such entity (apart from the body)”.—We infer the existence of such an entity through such acts as breathing and the like; so that the entity spoken of as “equipped with the sacrificial implements” is one who carried on such activities in the body as breathing in, breathing down, breathing out, winking, and so forth.—“But it is the body itself that breathes in and breathes down.”—Not so; breathing and the rest cannot belong to the same category as the properties of the body, because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts; as a matter of fact we find that the properties of the body, colour and the rest, continue to exist as long as the body is there; on the other hand, breathing and the rest cease to exist even while the body is there. Then again, Pleasure, Pain, and such other feelings are cognised only by the person himself, while colour and other properties belonging to the body are perceived by other persons also. [This also shows that there are certain activities of the person which belong to an entity other than the body.] From this fact of there being certain properties which differ from the properties belonging to the body, the conclusion is that the entity spoken of as ‘equipped with the sacrificial implements’ is other than the body.

The opponent asks—“How is it known that there is an entity other than Pleasure and other Cognitions to whom these latter belong? As a matter of fact, we do not see any form of such an entity apart from Pleasure and other Cognitions. This leads to the conclusion that the said entity is as non-existent as the Hare’s Horn.—If it be asked—‘To whom then do Pleasure and the rest belong?’—our answer would be that they belong to no one. It is not necessary that whatever is perceived must be related to some one else; we recognise one thing as ‘related’ to another only when we actually perceive the things related, as also the relation itself: When we see the moon or the

sun, we do not proceed to search the thing to which the moon or the sun belongs; in fact, we recognise that they belong to no one. From this we conclude that there is no entity apart from Pleasure and the rest to whom these latter belong.—Then again, if it be absolutely necessary to assume an entity to whom every perceived thing is related, then, in the same manner, on perceiving the *Self* (soul), we should search for another relative to whom that *Self* would belong;—and having found such another relative, we should search for yet another to whom this latter would belong; and so on and on there would be no end to such assumptions. If (in order to save yourself from this unending series of assumptions) you would not assume a further relative after having assumed a relative at a certain stage,—and you would stop short at that, and feel satisfied,—then you can rest content with positing the '*Vijñāna*' (Idea, Cognition) pure and simple and desist from all further assumptions."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—If there is no entity apart from the *Cognition*, then who is it that is spoken of as 'he knows'? The entity spoken of by this phrase is the nominative agent of the act of *cognising*; for the purpose of making this phrase give some sense, we should assume the existence of the *Self* distinct from the *Cognition*.

Says the opponent:—"Let the Divinities (Read '*devāḥ*') assume a meaning for the phrase if they regard it necessary to assume it! [It is beyond our power to do it]. As a matter of fact, there are many people upholding the existence of the *Self* who say 'the *Self* exists', who directly utter the word '*Self*'; and yet even these people do not succeed in assuming the existence of the *Self*; how much less possible is it to assume its existence on the basis of the indirect expression 'he cognises'? Hence we conclude that the assumption of the *Self* is not right."

Our answer is as follows:—It is through Desire that we perceive the *Self*.—"How so?"—Desire appears only when the desired object is one that has been perceived before: for instance, we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the North of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tasted by people like us. Nor does Desire appear in one person for an object that has been perceived by another person. And yet Desire does appear in a person for an object perceived by him on the previous day. From this we conclude that the person *desiring* and the person *perceiving* must be the same. If mere *Cognition* had been the *perceived* then, inasmuch as that *Cognition* would have disappeared on the preceding day (when the object was perceived), how could there be a *Desire* (for the same object) on the following day? If, on the other hand, there is a *cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*, who is everlasting, then the person *perceiving* the object on one day would be the same as the one *desiring* it on the other day. The phenomenon of Desire would be impossible otherwise.

Says the opponent:—"In regard to what do we have the idea that it cannot be possible? It is only in regard to what cannot be known by any means of right knowledge. Now, as a matter of fact, we do not know anything other than *Cognition* (Idea); and what we do not know we conclude to be non-existent, like the Hare's Horns. Nor is it impossible to have *Cognition* without that unknown something; because we actually have a direct

perception of the Cognition. That the Cognition has a momentary existence,—that too is a fact directly perceived. And yet, even though we have no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*,—and even though the Cognition is not a lasting entity (as it has only a momentary existence),—it is not impossible for Desire to appear on the next day; because we actually perceive the Desire so appearing. Nor have we found it always to be the case that the *Cogniser* today is the same as the *Desirer* on the next day; all that we have found is that in some cases what has been *perceived* by one man is *desired* by another, while in other cases it is not so. In fact [there being nothing except an influx of series of Cognitions] what happens is that within the same series one (Cognition) desires what has been perceived by another (Cognition); but in case the two belong to two different series, one does not desire what has been perceived by another. From all this we conclude that there is no Self apart from Cognitions like Pleasure and the rest.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is not possible that persons who do not *remember* (i.e. have an idea of) a thing should *desire* it; nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before; hence it is impossible that there should be remembrance in what is a mere momentary Cognition (Idea).

Says the opponent:—“The case of Remembrance is like that of Desire; what is called ‘remembrance’ is either a Cognition similar to a previous Cognition, or a Cognition having a previous Cognition as its object [and the same is the case with Desire also]. Now (such being the nature of Remembrance and Desire) even if the seer (i.e. the Cognition of the previous day) has ceased to exist on the next day, it cannot be impossible (for the Remembrance or the Desire) to appear on that day [i.e. there is nothing incongruous in the appearance of a Cognition on the second day which is similar to, or has for its object, the preceding day’s Cognition]; for the simple reason that we directly perceive that this does happen. What happens is that when a Cognition has been cognised by another Cognition, it is recalled by another Cognition occurring in the same series as the former apprehending Cognition,—and not by a Cognition appearing in the series of another Cognition.—From all this we conclude that Cognitions are entirely *Void* (i.e. without any extraneous substratum in the shape of the *Self*). In support of this view we have the following Brāhmaṇa text also:—‘This pure Cognition which rising out of the elemental substances (of the body, at death) enters those same substances, and there is no consciousness after death.’ (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4.5.13).”

Our answer to the above is that it cannot be as set forth above; as a matter of fact, it is only when one has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (Remembrance) on the next day in the form ‘I have seen it’; and this notion (of Recognition) appears only in the Self, not in anything else; as in the case of anything else, the entity that would have seen the thing on the previous day could be some one totally different (from the one recognising it on the second day). Hence it follows that there is something apart from Cognitions, and it is to this something that the term ‘I’ is applied.

Says the opponent:—“In several cases the term ‘I’ is applied figuratively to entities other than the Self,—when, for instance, a man says ‘I

am the son', 'I am Devadatta', 'I am going' [where the term 'I' stands for the *body*—says the *Shlokavārtika*, *Ātmavāda* 108]."

Our answer to this is that we do not put forward the use of the term 'I' as a *reason* for our conclusion (that there is a Self apart from the Cognitions); what we are pointing out (as the reason) is something different from the word 'I'; what we are pointing out (as our reason) is the *recognitive notion* [The right reading is '*pratyabhijñāpratyayam*' as found in *Nyāyaratnākara*, p. 716] that we have to the effect that 'It was *we* that saw this thing on one day, and it is *we* that remember it today'; which shows that we recognise the fact that 'it is *we* that existed yesterday and it is the same *we* that exist today'; and the entities that existed yesterday and exist today also could not have ceased to exist. In support of this (view of an enduring Self) we have the Brāhmaṇa-text—Having declared that 'This same is the Self', (*Bṛhadā-Upa.*, 4. 5. 13, where the reading is slightly different), it goes on to say—'Being imperishable, it perisheth not' (*Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 5. 15); and again, 'This Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption' (*Ibid.*, 4. 5. 15).—Cognition on the other hand is evanescent.—Hence we conclude that the Self (which is imperishable) must be something distinct from the Cognition which is evanescent. No one can hold the view that "things are *not* as they are found to be, they *are* as they are not found to be." For if that were so, then it would come to this that "the Hare does not exist, what does exist is the Hare's Horn"!—Nor again can the notion of 'I' be said to be an illusion; because we do not find any subsequent cognition sublativ of that notion.

From all this we conclude that there *is* a Self apart from Pleasure and other cognitions. And such being the case, it is this Self that has been spoken of in the Vedic text as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements'.

Says the opponent:—"If there is a *Cogniser* distinct from the *Cognition*, then, leaving aside the Cognition, please point out the *Cogniser*—'This and such is the *Cogniser*'. You cannot point out any such *Cogniser*. Hence we conclude that there is no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the *Cogniser* is self-cognised, he cannot be perceived by another; how then could he be pointed out to another? Just as for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour, but he cannot point it out to another who is blind,—and yet, simply because the Colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist;—in the same manner, a person cognises his own Self, but cannot point it out to another person, for the simple reason that (like the blind man) this other person does not possess the capacity to perceive the said Self (of the former person); and yet this other person cognises his own Self, but not the Self of other persons. So that all individual Selves cognising themselves must exist, even though none of them cognises the other Selves. In support of this we have the following Brāhmaṇa-text—'When speech ceases, what light does the Person possess? He possesses the light of the Self, O king' (*Shatapatha Brā-Mādhyandina*, 14. 5. 4. 11, and *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad*, *Kāṇva*, 4. 3. 9 where the reading is slightly different).—In support also of the view that one Self is not apprehended by another, we have the (Brāhmaṇa-text—'Being inapprehensible,

it is not apprehended' *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 3. 9. 25); what this means is that it is not apprehended *by another*;—'how so?'—because the Self has been spoken of as 'self-luminous' in the text 'Herein the Person is self-luminous' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 3. 9) [which means that the Self is cognised by itself, not by another self].—"By what means then can one Self be explained to another?"—This means also has been indicated in the Brāhmaṇa-text itself—"He said that this Self is *not this, not that*" *Bṛhadā-Upa.* 4. 23;—that is to say, it cannot be asserted that 'the Self has such and such a form'; the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying (i.e. rejecting) what the other person regards as Self; that is, if the other person regards the Body as the Self, he is taught that 'the Body is not the Self, the Self is something different from the Body',—where the teaching of the Self is done by denying the Body. Similarly the Life-breath and such other things not being the Self, the Self is taught by means of the denial of these as being something different from the Self. Similarly the Pleasure and other Cognitions of one person are inferred by another through certain signs, and by declaring that 'these are not the Self', the Self is taught as being something different from them. Lastly, that 'the Person (or Self) is not different from one who perceives himself' is also inferred from the activities of the person himself: for instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it and complete it on the next day; and from this action it is inferred that the Person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relation to things (like actions) that are evanescent. [Or, on the basis of the *evanescent* activities one comes to cognise the *enduring* Self.]

Further, through Analogy also this same Self is pointed out, in the words—"Just as you perceive your own Self, so on the same analogy, please understand that I also perceive the Self in the same manner." There are several such indications through Analogy; as for instance, a man indicating his suffering to another, says—"It is *as if* I were being burnt", 'It is *as if* I were being tortured', 'It is *as if* I were being hampered.'—Thus on the ground of this self-realisation, it is concluded that there is a Person (Self) distinct from Cognition.

It has been urged by the Opponent above—"Leaving aside Cognition please point out the *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."—Our answer to this is that when you leave aside the *means* itself, how can the *end* be attained without the means? The only means of knowing things is to realise that 'everything *is* as it is cognised to be'. For instance, what is 'white'?—It is that in which there is *whiteness*; i.e. that to which the term 'white' is applied.—To what is the term 'white' applied?—It is applied to that which is cognised (understood) whenever the term 'white' is uttered.—From this it will be seen that if we 'leave aside Cognition' (as suggested in our argument), we cannot indicate anything at all [as things can be indicated only as they are *cognised*].—Then again, there is no such hard and fast rule as that the *object of cognition* is cognised only when the Cognition itself is cognised; the object is actually cognised even when the Cognition is not cognised; for instance, *Cognition* is not amenable to Sense-perception, while

the *object known* is amenable to it. This we have already explained above (*Text*, p. 9, l. 15, where it is shown that the form of the *Cognition* is not the same as that of the *cognised object*).—So that if anything has to be ‘left aside’ (denied), *Cognition* itself might as well be left aside,—not objects. This also we have already explained (*Text*, p. 10, l. 4).

Thus we conclude that there is an everlasting Person apart from Pleasure and other cognitions.

The Opponent has quoted a text (from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*) speaking of the Cognition arising out of the elemental substances and entering the same, etc.—Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, after this passage had been addressed by Yājñavalkya to Maitrēyī, the latter complained of the teaching, saying ‘Hereby your Reverence has led me into delusion’ (*Shatapatha-Bṛā-Mādhya*. 14. 7. 3. 14), and in meeting this complaint, Yājñavalkya, repudiating all desire to delude her, has concluded by saying—‘I am not talking delusion; in reality this Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption; but It does come into contact with perishable things (like the Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit, and the like)’ (*Shatapatha-Bṛā-Mādhya*. 14. 7. 3. 15); from the whole context it is clear that the view of the Upaniṣad is *not* that Cognition is the only entity. Thus there is a great difference [between your view that there is no Self apart from the fleeting *cognitions*, and the view adumbrated in the Upaniṣad text quoted by you and taken along with its whole context].

Lastly, the Opponent has argued that the verb ‘goes’ (in the text ‘the Sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements *goes* straight to the heavenly region’) is not injunctive.—The particular word may not be injunctive; but it could very well be reiterative of the injunction contained in such texts as ‘Desiring heaven *one should perform sacrifices*’. So that there is nothing incongruous (in the non-injunctive character of the verb ‘goes’).
