

37. namely, *dīkṣā*.
38. namely, the four Vedas, six Vedāṅgas, the Purāṇas, Mimāṃsā, Nyāya and Dharmaśāstra.
39. BrS. 2.2.42.
40. A Naiyāyika. Traditionally, Nyāya does not accept the Mimāṃsā view that the Vedas have not originated from a person.
41. The argument is thus: The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language; language is invariably found to originate from persons. The Naiyāyika compares the Mimāṃsaka's view in the terms of this argument with the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke.
42. *avatāra* "descent, emergence." The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the means-end relation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority.
43. This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (*phala*) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation.
44. cf. Udayana, *Kuṣumāñjali* 4.1.
45. Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma).
46. This is the Mimāṃsā view which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being whose body is itself the product of dharma and adharma and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them. The Mimāṃsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction, but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally. No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act, by either beginning or ending the universe. On this cf. *Prakaraṇapāñcikā*, p. 137 ff. for the Prābhākara view, and *Śloka-vārttika*, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 47-116 for the Bhāṭṭa view.

47. lit. "that which is unprecedented, not known before, sc. by other means of knowledge;" in *Mīmāṃsā* it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result.
48. The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized; thus the act's power—*apūrva*—cannot be known beforehand as the instrument of effectuation. By the *Naiyāyika*'s definition only one who knows what instruments are effective in production can actually produce.
49. unidentified.
50. *mantra* and *arthavāda*: the terms indicate that the *Naiyāyika* continues to address the *Mīmāṃsaka*, for these of course are *Mīmāṃsā* terms, *mantra* being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, *arthavāda* the descriptive, non-injunctive passages of *Brāhmaṇa* and later Vedic texts.
51. RV. 10. 90. 14.
52. *Yāmuna* concurs in the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s refutation of the *Naiyāyika*'s views, to the extent that he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he will counter the *Mīmāṃsā* assertion that God cannot be proved at all, that in fact there is neither room nor purpose for a God in the universe. For *Yāmuna*, God has all the characteristics He has for the *Naiyāyika*, but he proves them from Scripture, not reason.
53. That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of *apūrva* facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertaining to dharma.