

Īśvara as the Creator of the World, is not proved.

नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ५ । २ ॥

न Na, not. ईश्वराधिष्ठिते Īśvara-adhiṣṭhite, in that which is superintended or presided over by Īśvara. फलनिष्पत्तिः Phala-niṣpattiḥ, production or resulting of fruits or consequences of acts. कर्मणा Karmaṇā, by means of Karma or Adhiṣṭam. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof of it.

2. Not because (the cause is) directed by Īśvara, (that there is) the resulting of fruits, because the production thereof (takes place) by means of Karma.—329.

Vṛitti :—The non-existence (a-sattvam) of Īśvara has been established before. The author now states the argument (nyāya):

Were Īśvara an independent creator, he would create even without (the aid of) Karma, (but that is not so). If you say that he creates, having Karma as an auxiliary; then let Karma itself be (the cause), what need of Īśvara? Nor can an auxiliary obstruct the power of the principal agent, since, in that case, there would be a contradiction of its independence.

Moreover, activity is seen to proceed from egoistic and altruistic motives. Neither can any egoistic motive belong to Īśvara. And were his motives altruistic, then, he being compassionate, there would be no justification for a creation which is full of pain. Nor is there any activity which is purely altruistic, because such activity proceeds from a desire for selfish gain even by means of doing good to others, etc.

Therefore, let Karma alone be the cause of the world.—2.

Bhāṣya :—There are Pūrva-pakṣins or opponents who maintain that what has been declared before, namely,

ईश्वरासिद्धेः

Because Īśvara is not a subject of proof.—S. P. S. I. 92.

—that is not justified, because there is proof of Īśvara by means of his being the giver of the fruits of acts.

The author refutes them.

When the cause is superintended by Īśvara, there is the resulting of the transformation in the shape of the fruit of acts,—this is not proper, because of the possibility of the resulting of fruits by means alone of the necessary Karma. Such is the meaning.—2.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—When the cause is superintended by Īśvara, there is the production of the effect, since it is seen that in clay, etc., superintended by the potter, etc., there is the production of the jar, etc.

This view the author discredits.

Does Īśvara create by depending upon Karma or does he create by not depending upon it? In the former case, let Karma alone be the cause, and not Īśvara. In the latter case, there will be contradiction to his independence. Further, is the activity of Īśvara egoistic or is it altruistic? It is not the former, because it is postulated (in the very conception of Īśvara) that all his desires have been fulfilled. It is not the latter, since there is no reason for his activity in a painful creation, when he is compassionate.

Īśvara, as the Moral Governor of the World, is not proved.

स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् ॥ ५ । ३ ॥

Sva-upakārāt, because of his own benefit. *Adhiṣṭhānam*, superintendence. *Loka-vat*, as in the world, like that of man.

3. Because of his own benefit, (Īśvara's) superintendence (will be) like that of man.—330.

Vṛitti:—The author shows this (that all activity is ultimately selfish).

Nor does personal benefit exist consistently with him who is eternal.

—3.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—The author, moreover, shows that whoever superintends the cause, does so only for his own benefit, and that, similarly, it will be so also in the case of Īśvara.

In “*Sva-upakārāt*” which is the fruit (of superintendence), the fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of cause or reason.

Bhāṣya:—By a number of aphorisms the author shows that even to be the giver of fruits is not possible in the case of Īśvara.

Were Īśvara to be the superintendent, since it would be only for the sake of subserving his own end, the superintendence will be like that of man. Such is the meaning.—3.

Above continued.

लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ॥ ५ । ४ ॥

Laukika-īśvara-vat, like the human lord. *Itara-thā*, otherwise.

4. Otherwise, (Īśvara will be) like the human lord.

—331.

Vṛitti:—But the opponent may say that there will be no harm if (Īśvara's) own benefit be the motive of his superintendence. In regard to this the author says :

(Īśvara, in that case, will be) non-omniscient (which is not desirable). Such is the meaning.—4.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—"Itara-thā," on the admission of his own benefit, "Laukika-īśvara-vat," as in the case of the human lord, there will be the implication of his not having attained all his desires.

Bhāṣya :—Let there be the benefit of *Īśvara* also, it may be said ; what is the harm ?

Apprehending such a rejoinder, the author says :

On the admission of the benefit of *Īśvara* also, he too, like the human lord, will be *Samsāri*, i.e., revolving on the wheel of the world, because, by reason of his desires not having been fulfilled, there will be the implication of pain, etc. Such is the meaning.—4.

Above continued.

पारिभाषिको वा ॥ ५ । ५ ॥

पारिभाषिकः *Pāribhāṣikah*, technical, nominal. वा *Vā*, or.

5. (Otherwise, *Īśvara* will be like the human lord), or nominal.—332.

Vṛtti :—The author points out another defect in the opponent's view.

By reason of the falling of the shadow of *Prakṛiti*, through her being the doer, arises the idea : It is the Self that is the door. Hence is its name of *Īśvara*. This is a form of nomenclature.—5.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—Were *Īśvara* different in character from the human lord, then he will be just the technical *Īśvara* of the *Sāṃkhya* System ;—this is what the author says.

"*Vā*" has been used in the sense of "*Ēva*" or certainty.

Bhāṣya :—Just so let it be, it may be said. Apprehending this the author says :

In spite of the existence of worldly life, were he still to be *Īśvara*, then "*Īśvara*" will, as with us, so with you also, be a mere technical name to denote the *Puruṣa* who is produced at the beginning of Creation ; because, owing to the contradiction of being worldly and of having unobstructed will, eternal *Īśvara*-hood will not be proved. Such is the meaning.—5.

Above continued.

न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ॥ ५ । ६ ॥

न *Na*, not. रागादृते *Rāga-dṛite*, without passion or attachment. तत्सिद्धिः *Tat-siddhiḥ*, accomplishment of it, i.e., superintendence. प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् *Prati-niyata-kāraṇa-tvāt*, being the invariable and unconditional cause.

6. Without Rāga or passion, superintendence is not established, because Rāga is the invariable and unconditional cause in all activity.—333.

Vṛitti:—The author adduces another reason.

In the case of the wandering away or failure of the cause which never exists without relation to the effect, there will be the negation of expectation everywhere. And Rāga is the efficient cause of activity. Hence, without it, how (can it be possible for Īśvara) to be the maker of the world? Nor does Rāga belong to one who is released (such as the supposed Īśvara must be).—6.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions another hindrance to Īśvara's being the superintendent.

Moreover, without Rāga, to be the superintendent is not established, because Rāga is the invariable cause in the case of activity. Such is the meaning.

"Upakāra" (in V. 3) is the accomplishment of the object desired. Whereas "Rāga" is intense desire. Thus there is no tautology.—6.

Rāga cannot exist in Īśvara.

तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ॥ ५ । ७ ॥

Tat-yoge, in the case of connection with that, i. e., Rāga. *अपि* Api, even, again. *न* Na, not. *नित्यमुक्तः* Nitya-muktaḥ, eternally released or free.

7. On (the admission), again, (of) connection with Rāga, (he will) not (be) eternally free.—334.

Vṛitti:—Certainly Rāga will exist (in Īśvara), it may be said. In regard to this the author says :

("Tat-yoge'pi"), on the connection of Rāga, again.—7.

Bhāṣya:—Well, that being so, let, it may be said, there be Rāga also in Īśvara. To this, the author replies :

While, again, the connection of Rāga is admitted, he will not be eternally free; and thence also is your doctrine injured. Such is the meaning.—7.

The condition of Īśvara cannot arise through connection with the power of Prakṛiti.

प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः ॥ ५ । ८ ॥

Pradhāna-śakti-yogāt, through connection with the power of Prakṛiti. *चेत्* Chet, if. *सङ्गापत्तिः* Saṅga-āpattiḥ, implication of association or attachment.

8. If (you say that the condition of being Īśvara arises) through connection with the powers of Prakṛiti, (then there will be) the implication of (his) attachment.—335.

Vṛtti:—Through connection with the powers of Prakṛiti, it may be said, there will be the agency (of the Self). In regard to this, the author says:

(Says the Śruti).

असक्तो ह्ययं पुरुषः

Verily is this Puruṣa free from attachment.—*Bṛihat Aranyaka Upaniṣat*, IV, III, 16.

Of this there will be the implication of contradiction.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Moreover, the condition of being Īśvara, in regard to Prakṛiti, cannot be possible by means of desire, etc., which are just the transformations of Prakṛiti; since, in that case, there will be the fault of mutual dependence: the energising of Prakṛiti after the production of desire, and desire, etc., after the activity of Prakṛiti. Eternal desire, etc., on the other hand, are not appropriate in the case of Prakṛiti, as, on that supposition, there will not be established her state of equilibrium, as proved in the Śruti and the Smṛiti. Hence two other modes (in which the condition of being Īśvara may appear in the Self) are left. They are: (1) Does the condition of being Īśvara arise just through direct connection with the Chetana or the intelligent principle, of desire, etc., which are admitted by us as being the attributes or properties of Prakṛiti? Or, (2) does it arise through her being the mover to activity merely by means of her proximate existence, as in the case of the loadstone? *

Of these two, the author discredits the first alternative.

Through connection, with Puruṣa, of the powers of Prakṛiti, viz., desire, etc., there will be the implication of attachment of attributes in Puruṣa also; and so there will be contradiction of such declarations in the Śruti as:

स यदत्र पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति ।

असक्तो ह्ययं पुरुषः ॥

Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for he, Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—*Bṛihat Aranyaka Upaniṣat*, IV, III, 16.

Such is the meaning.—8.

* F. E. Hall reads the whole of this paragraph as forming the concluding portion of the Commentary on the preceding aphorism, Garbe reads half of it there, that is, "Moreover,..... Smṛiti", and the remaining half at the beginning of the Commentary on the present aphorism. None of these readings is correct. The passage "Moreover,..... Smṛiti" has no more textual relevancy under the preceding aphorism than has the other passage beginning with "hence".

The condition of being Īśvara cannot arise through vicinity of Prakṛiti.

सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्वेश्वर्यम् ॥ ५ । ९ ॥

Sattā-mātrāt, through mere existence. *चेत्* Chet, if. *सर्वेश्वर्यम्* Sarva-aiśva-ryam, condition of being Īśvara in all cases.

9. If (it be said that the condition of being Īśvara may arise) through the mere existence (of Prakṛiti by the side of Puruṣa), (then) the condition of being Īśvara (will belong) to all (Puruṣas). --336.

Vṛitti:—Not that association with Prakṛiti (is desired), it may be said; but by the mere existence of Prakṛiti there will appear agency in Puruṣa. In regard to this the author says :

Since there is no distinction in the existence of Prakṛiti in relation to all Selves, all Selves will be Īśvaras.—9.

Bhāṣya :—In regard to the second alternative, the author says :

Were the condition of being Īśvara to arise by the mere existence of Prakṛiti in the vicinity, just as in the case of the loadstone, then, is established exactly what is intended by us, namely, the condition of being Īśvara belonging, without distinction, to all whatever, that is to say, to Puruṣas who are the experiencers in respective creations ; because it is only through conjunction with the whole lot of experiencers that Prakṛiti creates things beginning with Mahat. And thence, "There is but one Īśvara"—this tenet of yours is lost. Such is the meaning.—9.

There is no proof of an eternal Īśvara.

प्रमाणाभावात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १० ॥

Pramāṇa-abhāvāt, on account of non-existence of proof. *न* Na, no. *तत्सिद्धिः* Tat-siddhiḥ, establishment thereof, i.e., of an eternal Īśvara.

10. On account of the non-existence of evidence, (there is) no proof of an eternal Īśvara.—337.

Vṛitti:—But, then, there are means (of proving the existence) of (one eternal) Īśvara. How, then, it may be asked, can this be so (that all Selves are Īśvaras)? In regard to this the author says :

On account of the non-existence of perceptual proof or evidence of sense-perception.—10.

Vedāntin Mahādeva:—"Tat-siddhiḥ", proof of the existence of Īśvara. Because the non-existence of the evidence of sense-perception is well-known.

Bhāṣya :—It might be so, rejoins our opponent; but, by reason of their conflict with the proofs demonstrative of *Īśvara*, these are nothing but invalid arguments; otherwise, the existence of *Prakṛiti* also is capable of being obstructed by means of thousands of similar invalid reasonings.

To this the author replies :

“*Tat-siddhiḥ*”, the establishment of an eternal *Īśvara*. In respect of *Īśvara*, to be sure, there is no evidence of sense-perception. Hence Inference and Testimony must be intended to be the proofs supposed here, and they are not possible. Such is the meaning.—10.

Inference of Īśvara is impossible.

सम्बन्धाभावाद्ानुमानम् ॥ ५ । ११ ॥

सम्बन्धाभावात् Sambandha-abhāvāt, owing to the non-existence of the relation, i.e., the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of one thing by another, that is to say, the general proposition. न Na, no. अनुमानम् Anumānam, inference.

11. Owing to the non-existence of the *Vyāpti* or pervasion, (there is) no inference (of *Īśvara*).—338.

Vṛitti:—It may be said that there will be inference (of the existence of *Īśvara*). In regard to this, the author says:

Since *Vyāpti* or the general proposition as to the pervasion of one thing by another or their universal going together, must have sense-perception to precede it, in the absence thereof (as stated in the preceding aphorism), how can there be the apprehension of the universal relation? Neither can there be the apprehension of the universal relation in the case of an uncommon thing—11.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—“*Sambandha-abhāvāt*”: on account of the non-existence of *vyāpti*.

Bhāṣya:—By means of two aphorisms the author demonstrates their impossibility.

“*Sambandhaḥ*” is *Vyāpti* or pervasion; “*Abhāvaḥ*” is non-establishment. So that, by reason of the fact that *Īśvara*’s being the thing to be pervaded, (that is, the middle term of the syllogism), is not established, inasmuch as he (i.e., knowledge of him) is not required to cause inference in such cases as “*Mahat* and the rest must-have-a-cause, because they are effects”, etc., there can be no inference in respect of *Īśvara*. Such is the meaning.—11.

Note.—*Vyāpti* is the principle of inference. Its operation may be seen from the following illustration :

Pratijñā :—The mountain contains fire ;

Hetu :—Because there is smoke in it ;

Udāharāṇa :—Whatever possesses smoke, possesses fire, e.g., such as the kitchen hearth ;

Upanaya :—The mountain also possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire ;

Nigamana :—Therefore, it contains fire.

Now let us put the ontological argument in favour of the existence of Īśvara into the form of the above syllogism, and see what is wanting.

Thus,

Pratijñā :—The Creation must have Īśvara as its cause ;

Hetu :—Because it is an effect ;

Udāharāṇa :—Whatever is an effect, has Īśvara as its cause ;

Upanaya :—The Creation also is an effect which is pervaded by a cause ;

Nigamana :—Therefore, it must have Īśvara as its cause ;

It will at once be seen that the argument is defective. The Vyāpti which is the principle of inference in the present case, is that whatever is an effect has Īśvara as its cause. But such a principle can never be established, because an instance of it (i. e., an effect being actually created by Īśvara) has never been observed. And if the principle of inference fails, the whole argument, of course, necessarily falls to the ground.

There is no Śabda in regard to Īśvara as Creator.

श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य ॥ ५ । १२ ॥

श्रुतिः Śrutiḥ, Śruti, Vedic declarations. अपि Api, also. प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य Pradhāna-kārya-tva-sya, of being the product of Prakṛiti. N. B. Aniruddha does not read "tva," "being."

12. The Śruti also (speaks of the web of creation) being the product of Prakṛiti.—339.

Vṛitti :—It may be said that there will be Śabda or Word proof (of the existence of Īśvara). In regard to this, the author says :

There is the Śruti :

प्रधानाजगदुत्पद्यते ।

From Prakṛiti is the world produced.—Source not traced.

Therefore, the proofs demonstrative of the existence of Īśvara are apparent and not real.—12.

Bhāṣya :—Nor is there Śabda or Verbal Testimony, also, says the author.

In respect of the web of creation, there exists Śruti or Vedic declaration of its being the product of Prakṛiti, but not of its having an intelligent being as its cause. For example :

सज्जामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णं त्रीणि प्रजाः सूक्ष्मानां सकृपाः ।

(सृजामेकोऽहो शुक्लामेकमुदरोते अहोत्वेनां शुक्रमेकमजोऽहो) ॥

(One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with) One Unborn (Prakṛiti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. (The other Unborn deserts her, after she has been enjoyed).—*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat*, IV. 5.

तदेवं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियते

Verily, that, the same, was then undifferentiated; it is differentiated by means of name and form.—*Bṛihat Āruṇyaka Upaniṣat*, I. iv. 7.

Such is the meaning.

What Śruti, on the other hand, exists about an intelligent entity's being the cause; viz.

तदेकत बहु स्याम्

It looked up, "I shall be many."—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*, VI. ii. 3, that has reference (not to the innate and eternal knowledge of an eternal Īśvara, but) to the knowledge which is capable of being produced in the Mahā Puruṣa or Great Puruṣa produced at the beginning of creation and having the Principle Mahat as his Upādhi or external investment. Or, having regard to the being many, the Śruti may be said to have a secondary reference to Prakṛiti herself; as is the case with "The banks of the river are *desiring* (about) to fall down"; since, otherwise, will not be proved in Puruṣa that character of not undergoing transformation which is declared by such Śrutis as:

साक्षी चेता केवलो निगुणश्च ॥

(Puruṣa is) the witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of attributes—*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat*, VI. 11.

And it has been already explained (*cide* pages 6 and 143 *ante*) that this denial of Īśvara is a mere Prauḍi Vāda or bold assertion made with the object of evoking dispassion in respect of the condition of being Īśvara, and also with the object of demonstrating that there can be release even without the knowledge of Īśvara. Otherwise, there would be redundancy in the supposition of the secundariness of the eternality, etc., of Īśvara, as differentiated from those of the Jīva or Incarnate Puruṣa; because Puruṣa's characteristics of being immutable, etc., are proved by the admission of the eternal knowledge, desire, etc., caused by the Upādhis or external investments, as well as of the transformations beginning with Mahat. All this should be looked for in the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta-Sūtram.—12.

Note:—The last portion of the Bhāṣya would seem to require an explanation. In order to maintain the character of immutability, etc., in regard to the Jīva, you have got to admit that eternal knowledge, will, etc., do not in reality belong to the Jīva, but are only adventitious to him, and are, in reality, the transformations of Mahat, etc. Now, were the disputed denial of Īśvara, a real one, then with Īśvara must also go eternal knowledge, will, etc., which would be contrary to fact as well as to theory. Therefore, you will have to distinguish between Īśvara and Jīva as regards the characteristics of eternal knowledge, will, etc., and to suppose that, while these are primary in the case of the Jīva, they are secondary in the case of the supposed Īśvara.